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It was the purpose of this thesis to evaluate the ruling of a 
federal district court in Michigan in 1968 that the 1961 vertical mer- 
ger between Ford Motor Company and the Electric Autolite Company 
violated the Clayton Act.  Additional objectives were to analyze the 
spark plug industry using the industrial organization framework of 
market structure, conduct and performance and to assess the weight of 
vertical integration and potential competition in the merger. 
It was concluded that the court's analysis was essentially cor- 
rect and that the Ford-Autolite merger was anticompetitive.  It was 
also concluded that the spark plug industry is heavily concentrated 
with very high barriers to entry. 
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I.  AN INTRODUCTION 
The Facts 
On April 12, 1961, the Ford Motor Company purchased the fol- 
lowing assets from the Electric Autolite Company of Toledo, Ohio: 
1. Autolite's only spark plug plant in the United States; 
2. One of its six battery plants; 
3. The Autolite trade name and trademark; and 
4. All patent and license agreements covering the manufacture 
of spark plugs and batteries. 
In addition, Ford obtained limited distribution rights in the form of 
Autolite's nationwide franchises.  These included distributors, job- 
bers, and dealers which were involved in the sales of automotive 
replacement parts; it also included the sales organization that served 
these accounts.  Finally, a written agreement was contracted between 
the two firms calling for Autolite to furnish certain spark plugs, 
batteries, and ignition parts to Ford for a period not exceeding three 
years from the date of purchase. 
In November of the same year the Antitrust Division of the 
Justice Department of the United States instituted civil proceedings 
against Ford, charging it with a violation of the Clayton Act.  More 
specifically, the suit stated that the Ford-Autolite merger was an 
acquisition tending substantially to lessen competition and to create 
a monopoly in the production, sales, and distribution of spark plugs, 
batteries, ignition parts, and automobiles in direct violation of 
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
After an extensive trial before the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the Court dismissed the 
charge pertaining to the markets of ignition parts and automobiles. 
However, it found violations with respect to the markets of spark 
plugs and batteries.  Ford chose not to contest the judgment concern- 
ing batteries. 
On December 18, 1970, almost nine years after the suit was 
filed, the district court entered its final judgment.  Not only was 
Ford ordered to divest itself of the Electric Autolite spark plug 
facilities, but it also was enjoined from producing spark plugs for 
ten years.^ 
Ford appealed to the Supreme Court in February of 1971.  The 
case was argued before the Court in November of 1971, and at the time 
of this writing, the opinion of the Supreme Court is yet to be handed 
down. 
The Purpose 
The Ford-Autolite merger was one that occurred in a heavily 
concentrated industry approaching oligopolistic proportions.  Because 
vertical integration in the real world generally occurs in the broad 
range of structural situations between the polar extremes of perfect 
competition and monopoly, one economist has suggested that the proper 
approach in evaluating such integration should be empirical, rather 
than theoretical.  When analyzing and evaluating vertical integration 
in this setting the economist should "evaluate the structure of the 
markets in which integration occurs and then determine how the inte- 
gration may affect the structure and behavior of the industries in- 
volved. "2  However, while an empirical approach is certainly necessary 
a theoretical analysis is mandatory to interpret the facts.  This 
thesis will make use of both approaches. 
The purpose of this thesis is to attempt to evaluate the Ford- 
Autolite merger in accordance with these guidelines.  It will focus 
on the spark plug industry only; batteries will be excluded.  Our 
format will be the traditional framework of industrial organization 
analysis—structure, conduct, and performance dimensions. Moreover, 
we will direct attention to the public policy issues of the merger. 
Will forbidding the merger increase (result in better) market per- 
formance?  Will a divestiture ruling result in a more competitive 
spark plug market?  These questions lie at the heart of the Ford- 
Autolite merger.  Not only will we be seeking answers to these ques- 
tions but, we also will be concerned with the public policy questions 
raised by the merger.  Specifically, the economies of vertical inte- 
gration and the market power abuses of vertical integration will be 
analyzed. 
An analysis  of  the  Ford-Autolite merger is   important  to  the 
economist  in several  respects.     Perhaps  the most   important  is   that 
it is a true vertical merger.  Most mergers that have occurred and 
which have been prosecuted under the Clayton Act heretofore have had 
both horizontal and vertical dimensions.  Secondly, this merger may 
produce a landmark decision from the new Supreme Court that is pres- 
ently made up of four appointees of President Nixon.  The Burger 
Court's performance to date has shown a rightward move in civil, 
racial, and criminal issues to the extent that the Warren Court can 
now at some distance be viewed as an historical anomaly.  The ques- 
tion is:  Will the Ford-Autolite decision tell us how the Burger Court 
will stand on antitrust? 
In summary, then, the significance of the forthcoming decision 
is fourfold: 
1. It will help to clarify the Burger Court's position on anti- 
trust. 
2. It may clarify fully whether or not Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act applies to vertical as well as horizontal mergers. 
3. It will shed light on the so-called doctrine of potential 
competition and its significance in Section 7 cases. 
4. It may set a legal precedent for true or purely vertical 
mergers. 
The format of this thesis is simple and straightforward.  Chap- 
ter II deals with vertical integration in general.  It directs atten- 
tion to the different kinds of vertical integration as well as to its 
motivations and its measurement.  In addition it introduces and dis- 
cusses the potential competition doctrine.  Chapter III is a presenta- 
tion of an economic analysis of the spark plug industry using the 
industrial  organization  framework.     The analysis of  the  Ford-Autolite 
merger  is  the  subject of Chapter  IV.     Public  policy questions are  also 
considered.     Lastly,   the   final  chapter consists of a discussion of 
Ford's  alternatives  before  the merger and  the  summary and conclusions 
of  the   thesis. 
II.  VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND POTENTIAL COMPETITION 
Vertical integration occurs via ownership or contract.  In the 
case of ownership, it may be the result of either internal growth or 
direct acquisition.  The Ford-Autolite case involves vertical integra- 
tion by means of direct acquisition, i.e., a vertical merger.  Both 
forms of vertical integration are important and deserve adequate dis- 
cussion.  In this chapter it will be useful to devote a section to a 
general discussion of vertical integration and a section to the notion 
of potential competition.  Since the Ford-Autolite merger concerns the 
automobile industry, we will also present a discussion of vertical 
integration with reference to the automotive industry.  Moreover, we 
will attempt to point out the implications of the Ford-Autolite merger. 
Finally, the antitrust laws pertaining to vertical integration will 
also be examined in this chapter. 
Vertical Integration 
The Functions of a Firm 
In order to understand fully the economic phenomenon of verti- 
cal integration, it is useful to take a look at the firm itself.  If 
we consider the typical firm as purchasing inputs, combining these 
inputs and producing output, then, owing to the complex nature of the 
production process, the firm will be involved in a series of 
production processes or   functions.     Professor Stigler describes   these 
processes  in this   fashion: 
The firm is  usually viewed as  purchasing a series of  inputs, 
from which  it  obtains one or more salable products,   the  quanti- 
ties of which  are related  to  the  quantities  of the  inputs by a 
production  function.     For our  purpose   it  is  better  to  view the 
firm as  engaging in a  series of  distinct operations:     purchas- 
ing and  storing materials;   transforming materials   into  semi- 
finished products and semifinished products   into  finished 
products;   storing and selling the  outputs;  extending credit   to 
buyers;   etc.    That  is, we partition the   firm not among  the 
markets  in which  it  buys   inputs  but  among the  functions  or pro- 
cesses which constitute  the  scope of its activity.^ 
Stigler's description explains   the  basic activities  of  the 
firm.     With  these   in mind  the next  step is   to define vertical   integra- 
tion. 
Definitions 
The degree of vertical   integration existing within a   typical 
firm is  described by  the  extent  to which   these  functions and produc- 
tion processes mentioned   by  Stigler are performed within the   firm.     If 
these different   functions  or stages of production are viewed as  a  con- 
tinuous  stream of economic activity,   originating with  the raw materi- 
als stage and proceeding  downstream to   the  ultimate consumer,   then  the 
economic  system can be coordinated and synchronized either  by  the 
market process   (the  price mechanism in a private enterprise  economy) 
or by vertical   integration.     A firm that  performs  all  of  the  processes 
connected with a particular final  product or  service  is completely 
vertically  integrated.     Thus,   vertical   integration is  a description of 
the  internal  structure of a  firm.     It   is a  preemption or supersession 
of the price mechanism, which is caused by a firm performing at least 
two successive stages of production which could be performed by two 
independent business firms. 
An example will help to illustrate vertical integration.  A 
loaf of bread goes through several stages of production before it 
reaches a consumer--the farmer grows the grain, the miller grinds it, 
the baker performs his contribution and the grocer markets the final 
loaf.  From the earth to the final consumer it has passed through 
four productive units which have processed the good.  If a firm were 
to integrate itself vertically in the production of bread, it would 
perform all four of these functions. 
Vertical integration is usually divided into forward and back- 
ward integration. The former refers to downstream integration or the 
ownership by a firm of succeeding stages of production, i.e., it is a 
movement in the direction of the ultimate user of the final product 
or service. On the other hand, backward integration involves a move- 
ment in terms of ownership upstream to preceding stages of production 
in the direction of the supplier.  In the words of one economistt 
Backward vertical integration exists if the unit which initiated 
the vertical integration is closer to the ultimate consumer than 
any other unit . . . forward vertical integration exists if the 
unit which initiated the vertical integration is further away 
from the ultimate consumer than any other unit. 
It is also useful to take the analysis one step further and 
differentiate between complete and partial integration.  If we consi- 
der any two successive functions, partial vertical integration refers 
to the extent to which a firm may continue to utilize the market as a 
source of supplies or as an outlet for disposal of part of its output. 
In the example above, a partially integrated firm might continue to 
purchase wheat from the farmer while performing the three successive 
stages itself or it might perform the first three and use the market 
for distribution purposes.  In contrast, a firm that is totally inte- 
grated vertically has within it the whole supply source or outlet 
system. 
Having discussed the firm's functions and also having defined 
vertical integration, we now turn to a consideration of the reasons 
for vertical integration. 
Motivations 
The motivations and reasons for vertical integration are numer- 
ous.  Probably the most common and obvious motive is to reduce costs. 
A classic example is provided by the steel industry where the need to 
combine technological complementary production processes is of primary 
importance in cost reduction.  Integration of diverse furnace with 
rolling mill operations eliminates the need for separate reheating 
steps.  In such instances economies of vertical integration can be 
realized, and in this case integration permits considerable savings 
in the total fuel requirement for heating the pig iron and steel. 
The elimination of certain costs of using the market can also 
be achieved by vertical integration.  Intermediate profit payments 
(included in the price of intermediate goods), sales promotion 
10 
activities and inventory costs can all be eliminated or reduced by 
vertical integration.  Other motivations include the fear of future 
price increase of raw materials, the desire for protection against 
losses and the fear of inadequate supply.  In the words of Scherer: 
. . .  Upstream integration, for example, can ensure that 
supplies of raw materials will be available in time of short- 
age and protect the firm from a price squeeze by monopolistic 
suppliers.  Downstream integration gives the firm greater 
control over its markets, lessening the probability, among 
other things, of foreclosure (being shut out from the market) 
by powerful buyers or middlemen.' 
It is also possible to realize economies in situations involv- 
ing non-complementary processes.  Economies in these instances can be 
attributed to functional efficiency or unified control by management 
over a sequence of operations.  Bringing different stages under the 
supervision of one management leads to efficiency of the physical 
processes by eliminating unnecessary handling and making the flow of 
goods more regular. 
Scherer also mentions certain adverse uses of vertical inte- 
gration: 
. . .  Firms integrated vertically may keep raw materials out 
of rival hands, or foreclose markets to rivals, or establish 
a vertical price structure (relating raw material to inter- 
mediate and end product prices) which squeezes profit margins 
of the less integrated competitor.  Integration may also af- 
fect pricing behavior in more subtle ways, e.g., by compli- 
cating price decisions to such an extent that rigidity ensues, 
or by increasing overhead costs (through the internalization 
of costs which would have been fully variable, if incurred by 
independent materials suppliers) and hence altering the inte- 
grated firm's susceptibility to local or general business 
downturns. 
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Other adverse results from vertical integration include the 
semisqueeze and the supplying of nonintegrated competitors on unequal 
terms, that is, price discrimination. 
Before moving to a consideration of the measurement of vertical 
integration, it should be emphasized that the adverse effects of 
vertical integration, and other effects too, are judged here in terms 
of partial equilibrium since a general equilibrium theory of monopoly 
does not exist. 
Measurement 
Why do we need to measure vertical integration? The answer is 
twofold.  First, we want to quantify market structure—the dimension 
under consideration in the Ford-Autolite merger.  Secondly, we need 
it to understand the extent to which the merger changed the structure 
of the spark plug market. 
Vertical integration is an important dimension of market struc- 
ture.  Other things being equal, the effect of a vertical merger is to 
raise the extent of vertical integration in the market.  It is impor- 
tant to measure the extent of vertical integration in order to assess 
the structural impact of the merger.  A number of different methods 
for measuring it have been suggested.  All of these indexes use a 
microeconomic approach and attempt to measure the number and signifi- 
cance of vertically related stages performed by a firm operating in a 
particular industry.  Probably the most common index is the ratio of 
value added to the sales of a particular firm.  The rationale of such 
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an index is that the magnitude of the ratio is a function of the num- 
ber of successive stages in the production stream that are performed 
by a firm.  Using Professor Adelman's example, consider three disinte- 
grated firms.9  Firm A produces raw materials, firm B is the fabri- 
cator, and the distributor is firm C.  Each firm contributes an equal 
amount to the total value of the final product.  The value added-to- 
sales ratio for firms A, B, and C respectively is 1.0, .5, and .33; 
the degree of vertical integration in this example declines progres- 
sively from the original to the final stage.  There is clearly a bias 
toward the original stage because the closer a firm is to the raw 
material end of the production stream, the higher is its value added- 
to-sales ratio.  In this case the index reflects the stage in the 
productive process which is being measured, rather than the degree of 
vertical integration.  Thus, the index is virtually useless when com- 
paring firms in different industries.  To a lesser extent when intra- 
industry comparisons are made this same weakness prevails unless the 
two firms under comparison are at the same productive stage.  More- 
over, if the index is used to compare two firms performing identical 
production operations, then the firm with greater profits will show a 
higher index of integration since value added includes the profits of 
the firm.10 The remedy for this profit bias is to calculate the pro- 
fits of the firm and subtract them from value added. 
An alternate measure of the degree of vertical integration has 
been advanced in the form of the ratio of the value of inventory to 
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sales.     Needham's  observations  about this   index are: 
.   .   .     The notion  that   increases   in   this   index indicate a  larger 
number of successive  stages  performed by  the  firm rests   upon  the 
implicit assumption that  the greater   the number of stages  per- 
formed,   the  greater will  be   the   level  of  the  firm's   total  inven- 
tory.     Vertical   integration which enables   a  firm to economize on 
stocks will   invalidate  this   line of  reasoning and result  in a 
smaller value  of  the   index  the   larger   the number of stages per- 
formed.     Like  the ratio of value added  to  sales,   the ratio of 
inventory  to  sales will  be affected by differential  rates of 
change  in  inventory and  final product  prices  respectively.     Such 
changes will   change  the   index even  though   the number of stages, 
and  physical   characteristics of   the  firm's  operations,   remain 
unchanged.H 
Another measurement  technique  is   an  index that  shows   the degree 
to which a  firm performing any  particular   stage of production is 
dependent upon markets  for  purchasing the  required  inputs   for  that 
stage or  for  the  disposal  of  the output of  that  stage.12    A require- 
ment of  this   index  is  separate measures  of  the  degree of backward and 
forward  integration  for each  stage of  production performed by a  firm. 
Needham discusses  the advantages of   this   type of index: 
An advantage  of  this   type of measure   is that either value or 
quantity data may be  employed and  the ratios are   invariant  to 
price   level   changes  since  both numerator and denominator of  the 
value  ratios   involve use of  the same  price.     Most of  the  prob- 
lems  arising out of  the use of such measures are   likely   to re- 
volve around   the definition of a stage  in the productive  process. 
Much of  industry  involves   two or more  successive  stages   in 
production which might   theoretically  be split among two  or more 
producers.     However,   attention  is generally   focused upon  those 
situations   in which  successive stages of production controlled 
by a  single managerial   supervision are  also,  or were previously, 
performed by   separate   firms. 
All   of these  indexes are  similar  in  that   they employ  different 
methods   to measure  the  same   thing.     While   it would be  informative   to 
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have vertical   integration  in  the  automobile   industry measured  in all 
of  these various ways,   only   the value added-to-sales  ratio  is  avail- 
able.     Recently Robert Crandall  attempted to measure  the  vertical 
structure of the  automobile   industry using this concept.     His  results 
are  presented  in Table   1. 
TABLE  1 
VA/S  FOR  THE  BIG  THREE  ASSEMBLERS 
Year G.   M. Ford Chrysler 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
.474 
.470 
.465 
.481 
.515 
.484 
.500 
.459 
.474 
.500 
.487 
.479 
.464 
.492 
.486 
.499 
.527 
.522 
.525 
.522 
.394 
.370 
.352 
.358 
.384 
.379 
.401 
.373 
.382 
.413 
.388 
.367 
.348 
.437 
.471 
.410 
.416 
.409 
.399 
.404 
N.A. 
.288 
.287 
N.A. 
.306 
.254 
.301 
.249 
.340 
.353 
.338 
.355 
.333 
.333 
.319 
.340 
.379 
.380 
.386 
.373 
N.A.—all data not available 
Source:  Robert Crandall, "Vertical Integration and the Market for 
Repair Parts in the United States Automobile Industry," 
Journal of Industrial Economics, March 1968, p. 216. 
The evidence in the table indicates that General Motors is and 
has been in recent times the most integrated automobile firm in the 
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industry.  Next comes Ford and then Chrysler.  Crandall interprets the 
trends shown in Table 1 as follows: 
. . .  The data for 1946 and 1947 reflect artificially low out- 
put which resulted from reconversion problems and labor boycotts. 
Since firms had to meet high fixed costs, this would result in 
larger VA/S for those years.  There is a continual increase in 
the ratios for the Big Three from 1948 through 1962, allowing a 
tentative conclusion that firms had been increasing their self- 
sufficiency in inputs to the assembly process.  The slight 
decline in 1962-63 is undoubtedly a reflection of record levels 
of output which have forced assemblers to increase their depen- 
dence upon suppliers in the short run.  Whether there will be 
further investment upstream by assemblers in order to restore 
the self sufficiency of the early 1960s cannot be foretold at 
this time. 14 
Table 1 shows that the value added-to-sales ratio for Ford de- 
creased from .471 to .410 during 1961 and increased from .410 to .416 
during 1962.  How much, if any, do these changes reflect the merger 
of Ford and Electric Autolite in 1961?  For all practical purposes 
the index remained unchanged during the year in question.  Perhaps the 
value added-to-sales ratio is a useless measure of vertical integra- 
tion.  Certainly it is not sufficiently sensitive to inform us of the 
structural consequences of the Ford-Autolite merger. 
Potential Competition 
The competitive consequences of vertical acquisitions can be 
analyzed in terms of a consideration of the direct effects of verti- 
cal integration and in terms of the removal of potential entrants. 
The effects of vertical integration have already been mentioned. 
Earlier, we discussed various adverse uses of vertical integration— 
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extension of market power, price squeezing, foreclosure, and struc- 
tural changes. The removal of potential entrants, on the other hand, 
involves the potential competition doctrine.  It consists of viewing 
customers and suppliers as likely potential entrants into related 
stages of production and examining whether or not a particular merger 
will eliminate an important potential entrant into the market under 
consideration.  This approach is particularly relevant to this thesis 
since the Ford-Autolite merger was attacked by the Justice Department 
on these grounds. 
The so-called doctrine of potential competition is a relatively 
new tool of the antitrust enforcement agencies which can be used to 
prevent or to dissolve different kinds of mergers—horizontal, verti- 
cal, and conglomerate.  It has been used primarily in the prosecution 
of conglomerate mergers.  Essentially, it states that such mergers 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act as amended, if they reduce 
potential competition (the emphasis is on potential as opposed to 
actual).  Although the courts have not ruled unambiguously that mer- 
gers which tend substantially to lessen potential competition are 
illegal, they have implied that such is this case.  The history of the 
doctrine in the context of these actual court cases is reviewed in a 
later chapter.  Here, it is sufficient to emphasize that the doctrine 
involves mergers among potential competitors or mergers in which the 
participating firms, in the process of their growth, would logically 
extend their operations into the same markets.  Such operations may 
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include the production of a new product or entering a new market area 
with a product that one of the firms already produces. 
We have emphasized the distinction between potential and actual 
competition.  Such a distinction is crucial and merits elaboration. 
The economic distinction between mergers among potential competitors 
and mergers among actual competitors is a matter of timing and the 
probability of anticompetitive consequences.  Markham best describes 
this difference: 
. . .  The merger of two actual competitors may substantially 
injure competition in existence today, while the merger of 
two potential competitors may substantially injure the com- 
petition expected to materialize tomorrow.  However, since 
all that potentially exists today may not actually come about 
tomorrow, the probability that the merger of two potential 
competitors will substantially injure competition ceteris 
paribus is not as high as it is in the case of the merger of 
two actual competitors.  But it is emphasized that the economic 
difference here is not fundamental but a matter of degree. 
Unfortunately, Markham only hints at the basic underlying issue 
of the doctrine of potential competition, that of the theory of limit 
pricing.  Specifically, it is Professor Bain's hypothesis that poten- 
tial competitors may be just as important in pricing and output deci- 
sions as actual competitors.  This theory is discussed fully in the 
fourth chapter. 
Thus, the economic rationale of the doctrine of potential com- 
petition, although the courts have not stated it as such, rests upon 
the theory of limit pricing.  It is also evident that heretofore, the 
courts have not made a clearcut ruling on the potential competition 
doctrine.  No court decision to the writer's knowledge has focused 
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unambiguously on this  question of potential  competition.     Thus,   the 
forthcoming ruling on the   Ford-Autolite merger by the Supreme Court 
will constitute  an important  landmark in antitrust  litigation.     This 
is   the significant  feature  of this  thesis. 
Crandall's measure of vertical   integration in the automobile 
industry provided us with  a  quantitative picture of the  industry as   it 
is   today.     However,  we need  a more  complete  picture—one  that reveals 
what  fields  of production  the automobile  producers are engaged in. 
Vertical   Integration in  the  Automotive Industry 
The  Ford-Autolite merger  involved  two  firms—one,   a member of 
the automobile  industry  proper,   and  the other,   a  part of the automo- 
tive parts   industry.     The  question  is,   then,  what  is  the  extent of 
vertical   integration  in these  two   industries? 
Currently  there are  four major producers  of automobiles  in the 
United States—General Motors,   Ford,  Chrysler,   and American Motors, 
the   first   three  commonly referred   to as   the  "Big Three"  and  the   latter 
representing the  only surviving "independent."17    These  four  firms 
rank respectively  in  terms  of sales  as  the  first,   third,   seventh,   and 
one hundred   tenth  largest   industrial corporations   in the United States 
economy.18    Over ninety-nine  per cent of  the  passenger cars  produced 
in  the United States are manufactured by  these   four  firms;   the Big 
Three alone accounts   for over ninety per  cent  of  total  domestic 
output.19     According to  state motor vehicle  registration records   for 
19 
the calendar year 1967, General Motors was the dominant seller in the 
market accounting for almost fifty per cent of sales.  However, it 
should be emphasized that the market here refers to a combination of 
domestic and imported automobiles.  Ford was next with approximately 
twenty-two per cent of sales, followed by Chrysler and American Motors 
which held approximately sixteen and three per cent respectively. 
These figures show that the automobile industry is a classic case of 
a tight oligopoly. 
Previously, the extent of vertical integration in the auto- 
mobile industry as measured by the value added-to-sales index was 
pointed out.  In theory, one would think that an automobile producer 
might be primarily an assembler of parts originating with outside 
suppliers but more than likely designed by the assembler himself. 
Such is not the case. Not only are the current producers of automo- 
biles assemblers, but they are also engaged in the production of com- 
ponent parts.  The extent of their integration is revealed by their 
assembly facilities as well as their stamping, casting, and machining 
facilities.  All four firms also employ their own designers as well 
as develop and test their own models.  With the exception of American 
Motors they cast their own engine blocks and cylinder heads and make 
their own automatic transmissions.  Moreover, they also own facilities 
for making glass, upholstery, steel, batteries, and, of course, spark 
plugs.21 
Vertical integration by the auto assemblers into full auto- 
mobile production and into the manufacture of automobile component 
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parts manifests itself clearly.  Of the following fields of production 
there is a clear pattern for the Big Three to produce some or all of 
their requirements, given some variation over time as technology and 
supplier bids change: 
1. engines, transmissions, casting, stampings:  all three 
2. valves, gears, clutches:  all three 
3. wheels:  all three 
4. brakes:  all three 
5. manual and power steering:  all three 
6. plastics and upholstery:  GM and Ford 
7. carburetors:  GM and Ford 
8. frames:  Ford (GM made part of its requirements until 
recently; Chrysler's unitized construction does not re- 
quire frames) 
9. air pollution control equipment:  GM and Ford 
10. electrical equipment:  all three (Autolite's former plants 
are included in Ford's facilities.) 
Automobile producers have not always manufactured these component 
parts; when the industry was in its infancy, the majority of the firms 
specialized in assembly alone.  They were particularly reluctant to 
produce their own parts because the capital requirements involved 
heavy fixed costs.  However, as the firms grew in size either by in- 
ternal expansion or merger or sometimes by both methods, parts were 
made for use in the vehicles.  General Motors currently produces more 
of its major components than any of its rivals and it has held this 
lead for decades despite the fact that Ford possesses a steel mill 
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and a glass plant.  The gap has been partially closed by Chrysler and 
Ford's backward integration.  Ford's acquisitions of Autolite probably 
helped to some extent.  In 1966, only forty-seven per cent of every 
General Motors sales dollar went to suppliers, compared to fifty-six 
and eight tenths per cent for Ford and fifty-eight and four tenths per 
cent for Chrysler.2^ American Motors is much less integrated and has 
a smaller volume and more limited capital resources than the other 
producers. 
What benefits do these automobile firms derive from vertical 
integration? What were the motivations that influenced them to inte- 
grate?24 The motives for vertical integration in the automobile 
industry can be conveniently separated into several groups:  (1) those 
yielding real economies; (2) those yielding pecuniary economies; and 
(3) those which can be fitted into either class. 
Probably the most beneficial motive of these automobile pro- 
ducers for vertical integration can be classified under group (3). 
Economies of joint production and the need for unified coordination 
and control play a decisive role in influencing backward integration. 
Consider the final assembly process in automobile production with all 
the separate assembly stations at different locations in the plant. 
If separate and independent firms handled each station in their own 
plants, the shipping costs would be exorbitant and the coordination 
problem would be difficult.  Backward integration reduces these ship- 
ping costs and makes the coordination problem less complex. 
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Moreover, the advantages of unified coordination and control 
extend beyond "in-house" production.  Designing, producing, testing, 
and modifying an automobile requires a great deal of coordination, a 
job that necessitates competent management.  All automobile components, 
especially the engine, transmission, frame, body, and brakes, must 
sustain good performance with each other and it is management's 
responsibility to see that these conditions are met as well as ensur- 
ing that these components are in their right place at the right time 
and in the correct quantities.  Moreover, if the goal of the auto- 
mobile firm is to emphasize product differentiation and the uniqueness 
of one's own product, close coordination and control is required to 
design and develop nonstandardized components.  One economist, who 
studied the automobile industry, observes: 
In such situations, coordination and control on an in-house 
basis is simply easier than the arm's length negotiations that 
take place between independent companies.  If a company wants 
to design a new car that will require a new engine (which, in 
turn, may require new manufacturing techniques), it feels more 
confident that the problems of developing the engine and inte- 
grating it with the body will be given full attention and 
solved in time if the efforts are all in-house.  A customer 
company is never quite sure that its suppliers' goals and its 
own goals are closely enough attuned.  It is never entirely 
certain that the supplier will not at some point say,  Sorry, 
but we can't supply that item."  Substitutes cannot always be 
found instantly; new tooling cannot be obtained overnight. 
Even matters such as scheduling meetings to coordinate pro- 
jects are easier in-house than at arm's length. 
Thus, we see that uncertainty is also an influencing factor; 
auto producers will integrate backward to ensure the future supply 
and delivery of components, especially those which have uncertain 
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technical characteristics.  This motive can also be classified under 
group (3). 
One postwar development in the automobile industry helps to 
illustrate this uncertainty of future supply of components as an 
influencing factor for integration.  In 1946, when the demand for 
automobiles was extremely intense, Kaiser-Frazer entered into a con- 
tract with Continental Motors to supply it with automobile engines. 
The relationship was entirely unsatisfactory and Continental was 
continually slow in delivering engines; the result was that Kaiser 
took over the operations of the engine plant. 
Henry Ford's motivations for building the Rouge—an industrial 
complex that includes not only an assembly plant but a steel mill and 
a glass plant among other units—were numerous, but one significant 
factor was the pursuit of coordination and control.27 The essence of 
the Rouge operations according to Ford himself was the control of raw 
materials, the control of their transportation to and from the plant, 
space for all necessary units and a close interrelationship among such 
units.  Ford had witnessed during World War I the scarcity of essen- 
tial raw materials—steel frames, malleable iron, steel for springs 
and engines, leather, and glass.  All of these items more than doubled 
in price.  Control of raw materials and a self-sufficient Rouge became 
a prime objective for him. 
Another motive for vertical integration in the automobile 
industry, classified under group (2), is to enter a potentially prof- 
itable area that has not yet been exploited.  One example would be to 
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integrate into parts production and sell the parts in the replacement 
market, or to integrate so as to reap greater profits from complemen- 
tary goods in consumption. Crandall has developed the latter example 
into a full-fledged argument for vertical integration.'" Since auto- 
mobiles and automobile parts are complementary goods, an oligopolist 
can control his profits by charging relatively less for automobiles 
(in order to generate demand) and more for replacement parts.  Such a 
price policy allows the oligopolist to maximize his profits by means 
of price discrimination.  The combined profits are greater than if 
prices for automobiles and for parts were set independently. 
The avoidance of strikes in suppliers plants or the control 
over the collective bargaining arrangement may also result in the 
decision to integrate.  Actually this motive could be a submotive of 
the pursuit for coordination and control.  The larger the size of the 
investment in operating facilities, the greater may be the anguish 
and frustration as production lines are halted because of an outside 
strike.  Substitutes are not always instantly available and the best 
recourse may be the manufacture of the items themselves.  From 1946 
to 1948 supplier strikes repeatedly disrupted production lines, the 
consequences of which appear to have been backward integration by 
automobile firms into items like plastics, upholstery, and electronic 
components.30  Partial integration was the result.  In 1959, Chrysler 
decided to build its own glass plant after a 135 day strike at 
Chrysler's only glass supplier, Pittsburgh Plate Glass. 
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Tapered or partial integration is common in the automobile 
industry.  Even though Ford has its own steel mill, it still purchases 
fifty per cent of its requirements from outside sources.  Chrysler 
buys fifty per cent of its glass requirements. 
What effect does vertical integration have on the structure and 
conduct of the automobile industry? One obvious structural effect is 
the raising of the already high barriers to entry.  For an efficient, 
viable producer of automobiles, it is estimated that a capital invest- 
ment of one billion dollars is required as a prerequisite for entry 
into the stages of stamping, casting, machining, assembly, and design 
and development.  Fifty million dollars are required for just a single 
final assembly plant.32 The internal advantages of coordination and 
control rule out the possibility of a number of separate assemblers, 
engine builders, foundries, and stamping plants comprising a non- 
integrated automobile industry, with the lower barriers to entry for 
each process serving as a check on each segment's behavior. 
Nonintegrated producers face a smaller selection among sup- 
pliers whenever integrated firms control most of the components mar- 
kets. They also are confronted with greater risks of failure of 
supply or of monopolistic exploitation.  Prospective entrants are 
also faced with a similar situation.  Integration may also increase 
the automobile firms' monopoly power in the replacement market. 
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Summary 
This  chapter has   focused on  the nature of vertical   integration 
in general  and on vertical   integration in  the  automotive   industry  in 
particular.     The  potential  competition doctrine was  briefly  intro- 
duced  to  provide background   information concerning  the Justice Depart- 
ment's  suit against   the Ford-Electric Autolite merger—a  direct asset 
acquisition by Ford of a potential   spark plug  supplier. 
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III.  THE SPARK PLUG INDUSTRY 
In this chapter the spark plug industry is analyzed within the 
traditional framework of the study of industrial organization.  We 
begin by considering the market structure of the spark plug industry 
and then turn to market conduct and market performance. 
Market Structure 
Introduction 
A spark plug is a relatively inexpensive but vital part of an 
internal combustion engine.  It is not purchased in and for itself 
but solely to obtain proper operation of the engine.  It is installed 
at the factory as original equipment by the engine or automobile pro- 
ducer and is replaced, on the average, about five times during the 
life of the engine.33 Usually, such a service is performed by a 
mechanic during an engine tune-up.  The basic function of a spark plug 
is to provide a spark to ignite the air-fuel mixture in the combustion 
chamber of the engine.  Its physical description is that it consists 
of two electrodes encased in a steel shell, overlayed for about half 
its length by a ceramic insulator.  At the bottom is a gap, calipered 
in hundredths of an inch or millimeters, that separates the two 
electrodes.  The exterior of the shell is threaded above the bottom 
so it can be screwed into each cylinder chamber of the engine.  When 
the unit is properly inserted into the combustion chamber of each 
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cylinder,   the  side  electrode  functions as  a ground by being in contact 
with  the engine block;   the central  electrode receives  the electrical 
current   from  the  generator.     As   soon as  the electricity arrives at  the 
tip or  bottom,   it   jumps   the gap  to ground  and  produces a  spark which 
in  turn  ignites   the air-fuel mixture. 
Historical  Background 
Spark  plug  production has   existed  in the United States   for over 
half a  century,   and  its growth has   loosely  followed  that of  the auto- 
mobile   industry.     Presently,   in an automobile-oriented society,   spark 
plugs are one of  the  top volume  automotive  parts  lines.     Historically, 
they have been consumed   in greater quantities   for repairing motor 
vehicles   rather   than  for   installation as  original  equipment.     Thus, 
the  replacement demand  for  spark plugs has   far exceeded  the demand  for 
original-equipment   spark plugs.     This   trend has  encouraged spark plug 
producers  to  concentrate   their efforts  on  the replacement market 
rather  than the original-equipment market. 
The  1963 Census  data  confirmed   the historical  pattern mentioned 
above.     Out of a  total  of  five hundred  twenty-nine million spark plugs 
produced   in the United States  during  that year,   sixty-five million 
were sold  in   the original-equipment market while the majority of  the 
remainder went   to   the  replacement market.34     In comparison,   in  1947 
unit  sales  in  the  original-equipment market  amounted   to almost   forty 
million while  approximately   two hundred  twenty-one million units were 
sold  in   the replacement market.35    These  figures reveal  that  the ratio 
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of replacement sales to total sales in 1947 was .85; in 1963 it was 
.88.  In addition, the ratio of 1963 replacement sales to 1947 
replacement sales was two hundred ten per cent in comparison to a 
ratio of one hundred sixty-three per cent for 1963 original-equipment 
sales to 1947 original-equipment sales.  These ratios indicate that 
the replacement market is clearly more important than the original- 
equipment market. 
In addition to motor vehicle applications, there is also a 
large volume of sales of spark plugs for non-automotive uses. 
Although spark plug producers do not produce solely for the automotive 
market, it is the most important market for the majority of them. 
The present day spark plug industry began to emerge in the 
United States economy during the period from 1910 to 1936.  R. A. 
Stranahan founded the Champion Ignition Company in Boston in 1907. 
Two years later, General Motors acquired the manufacturing assets of 
the firm except for its trade name.37  Since that time, General Motors 
has produced its own spark plugs under its own label.  It also sup- 
plied all of the spark plug requirements of Chrysler until 1936. 
The Champion firm continued to produce spark plugs under the 
Champion label after the acquisition by General Motors.  It was the 
sole supplier of spark plugs to Ford for more than fifty years.  This 
relationship ended when Ford, in 1961, acquired the spark plug facil- 
ities of Champion's smaller competitor, Electric Autolite. 
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A manufacturer of various electrical equipment, Electric Auto- 
lite entered spark plug production in 1936 at the request of and with 
the assured patronage of Chrysler.  At the time of the acquisition by 
Ford, Electric Autolite was third in percentage share of the spark 
plug market.  It accounted for approximately fifteen per cent of 
domestic spark plug production; this compared to fifty per cent for 
Champion and thirty per cent for General Motors.3' 
In the late 1950s, Electric Autolite was losing favor at 
Chrysler and feared it would be left with a fixed-volume plant and no 
customer large enough to support it. ° Consequently, the firm ap- 
proached Ford in order to obtain its spark plug business; the result 
was the Ford-Autolite merger. 
To summarize, the evolution of the spark plug industry has 
been closely tied to the production of automobiles.  At no time prior 
to 1961 was less than ninety-six per cent of domestic spark plug out- 
put attributable to Champion, General Motors, and Electric Autolite. 
Today, General Motors leads the United States' one hundred largest 
industrial corporations while Champion ranks three hundred forty- 
seventh.42 After 1961, the dominant firms in the industry were Cham- 
pion, General Motors, and Ford.  Presently, Ford ranks third among the 
one hundred largest domestic corporations.43 Before Electric Auto- 
lite' s advent, Champion and General Motors virtually shared the mar- 
ket; they were responsible for over ninety per cent of domestic output 
with Champion in the lead.  Ford acquired Electric Autolite in 1961, 
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and it  currently holds  the  third position in terras of market  shares 
behind Champion and General Motors.     On balance,   the only significant 
producers of  spark plugs have been closely associated with  the produc- 
tion of automobiles. 
With reference   to  Ford,  we noted  in  the  second chapter  that   it 
is a highly  integrated automobile  producer,   second only  to General 
Motors.     Also noted was  the fact   that   it manufactures  a  substantial 
portion of many of its  requirements,   although  it  began production 
solely as  an assembler.44    Among the components   in the electrical 
system of Ford vehicles,   spark plugs and batteries are  two  items  that 
were not  produced by Ford  prior  to the  Ford-Autolite merger.45    These 
components were  purchased   from outside  suppliers.     Today,  however, 
Ford produces most of the  parts   that  comprise the  ignition system of 
its vehicles. 
In order   to provide background   information necessary  to an 
understanding of  the  industry,   the events  that preceded Ford's acqui- 
sition of Electric Autolite's  spark plug and battery facilities must 
be considered.     These  follow. 
Preacquisition Events 
In  1911,  Champion adopted  the practice, now common in  the  spark 
plug industry,   of selling original-equipment   spark plugs  to  automobile 
producers  at  approximately  the  cost of   labor and materials.46     In the 
early period of the Champion-Ford relationship,  Champion's  price  to 
Ford reflected only  these  inputs;   the result was   that  the price was 
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often as much as ten cents per plug below total unit cost.47 This 
"six-cent price" offered by Champion for original-equipment spark 
plugs remained stable through the years despite substantial increases 
in production costs.  In 1960, Champion still supplied Ford with these 
plugs at $.0588--a price that was then approximately one third "the 
cost of manufacture."   It must be assumed, then, that although the 
six-cent price does not presently represent the marginal cost of pro- 
ducing spark plugs for Ford, it may have been equal to it in the early 
period of the relationship between Ford and Champion.  If we imagine 
the replacement cost to be fixed, then, this equality must have been 
true because any price greater than $.0588 would have more than likely 
encouraged Ford to integrate into spark plug production itself. 
why did Ford obtain original-equipment spark plugs at a price 
less than marginal cost? The answer is twofold.  First, automotive- 
component suppliers will offer price concessions on original equipment 
to automobile producers in order to prevent them from integrating 
backward and entering their markets.  Crandall discusses this behavior 
in his dissertation concerning vertical integration in the United 
States automobile industry.  He emphasizes that supplier losses from 
original-equipment sales are less than the potential losses which 
would be encountered upon the entry of automobile producers into the 
spark plug market.49 Secondly, spark plug producers have a vested 
interest in what is commonly referred to in the automobile industry 
as the "OE tie" (original-equipment tie).  This refers to the 
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propensity of mechanics and owners to replace spark plugs with the 
same brand that was originally tailored to the engine and installed by 
the automobile producer.  The primary reinforcement of mechanics' fear 
that serious damage may follow from the failure to use the OE brand is 
promotional literature originating with automobile producers' emphasis 
on the use of "genuine parts."  It is clear that the OE tie is a psy- 
chological phenomenon and is not technically necessary.  Normally all 
active brands of spark plugs appear on a full line of automobiles of 
every variety and they function well in all automobiles. 
A preference on the part of automobile dealers, mechanics, and 
owners for original equipment is highly valuable to spark plug pro- 
ducers in terms of the advertising advantages that adhere to the 
appearance of their trade names on original-equipment spark plugs. 
Although a certain percentage of owners are aware of the brand of 
spark plugs in their automobiles, the real brand choosers today are 
the mechanics.51 This is in sharp contrast to the buying patterns in 
the early part of the twentieth century, when the automobile industry 
was in its infancy.  Self-repair was prevalent then, and the owner 
normally performed the necessary maintenance himself. 
Champion's replacement business began operations after the suc- 
cess of its original-equipment business.  By 1924 its sales comprised 
about eighty per cent of the original-equipment spark plugs used in 
the automobile industry.  In 1925, its position began to decline, and 
by 1946 its sales of thirty-three million spark plugs to automobile 
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producers   for original-equipment  and replacement  uses amounted  to 
approximately one-sixth of  its   total  volume.     The remainder consisted 
52 of sales   to the replacement market through other channels. 
Champion's  lucrative replacement  sales   led  Ford  to an  investi- 
gation of increasing  its  share of the  replacement market.    A Ford 
study revealed a  steady growth pattern  in the replacement market.     It 
also  indicated  that  total   sales   in that market extended   into  the 
billions of dollars.53    The  stability of the market made   it attractive 
as  a potential  source of profits.    Replacement-market sales have his- 
torically been characterized by   less volatility  in the context of  the 
business  cycle  as compared   to sales  in  the new car market.     In good 
years,  replacement  sales grow with new car registrations,   while  in off 
years  there  is  less of a decline because of the necessity  for owners 
to continue  to make repairs   in order  to ensure a  longer   lasting auto- 
mobile. 
Ford's observations had long shown a declining share of  the 
replacement market.    The  facts  revealed  that   its  replacement market 
share had not kept pace with its   portion of  the automobile market. 
Sales  to  the replacement market  through  its   franchised dealers had 
declined substantially over  a period of time primarily because  of a 
change  in the service habits of  the automobile owning public.     Auto- 
mobile owners  shifted  their   tune-up and minor repair business   from 
the  franchised dealers   to various other retail outlets—gasoline 
stations,   independent  garages,  and automobile specialty shops. 
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A sizeable  portion of  the maintenance business  of Ford's  franchisers 
was   lost   to   these outlets.     Moreover,   these  franchisers were not an 
effective source  of supply  for repair parts,  because most retail out- 
lets  found   it more  convenient  and economical   to obtain  these  parts 
from the major channels of distribution serving  the replacement mar- 
ket.    A Ford-conducted  survey   in  1960  indicated  that   the volume of all 
servicing done by   franchisers  dropped   from twenty-eight  per  cent  to 
sixteen per cent   in 1952,  while  the share attributable  to gasoline 
stations  increased  from thirty-four  per cent  to   forty-seven per cent. 
The  licensees'   portion of minor mechanical   repair work declined  dur- 
ing  the eight year  period  from thirty-nine  to   twenty-four per cent. 
Retail gasoline outlets  absorbed almost all  of this  difference.55 
Although  this  trend could not be  reversed,   Ford   felt   it  could mini- 
mize its   losses   if  it could obtain production profits  on various 
components moving   through  these distribution channels.     In addition, 
Ford knew that  in order  to  increase   its  share of the  replacement 
market,   it had  to offer parts  applicable to all makes  of automobiles 
rather than  to Ford models  exclusively. 
Ford arrived  at   the  conclusion that   in order   to   increase  signi- 
ficantly  its   participation  in  the replacement market   it must: 
1. Offer a complete  line of high volume service parts which 
fit competitive makes  of automobiles  as well  as   Ford 
vehicles. 
2. Establish a nationwide distribution organization oriented 
toward  this  market. 
3. Have a nationally recognized brand name. 
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Since spark plugs and batteries are high volume service items 
and are able to function well in all automobiles, these components 
could effectively satisfy the first requirement.  However, the second 
and third requirements stimulated Ford, in 1960, to explore the pros- 
pects of upstream integration into the production of spark plugs and 
batteries.  Ford's study forecast optimistic possibilities with res- 
pect to spark plugs.  (Prospects for battery production were highly 
discouraging.  The study pegged future earnings from battery opera- 
tions at five and one-half per cent of capital employed, an estimate 
which was considerably lower than the company norm of fifteen per cent 
for new investments.) The prospects of expansion in the spark plug 
market were considerably brighter; on the basis of a five per cent 
penetration of the replacement market, it predicted a long term after 
tax yield on capital of twenty-four and three tenths per cent.57 This 
favorable estimate resulted in a recommendation to build a plant with 
a potential capacity of fifty-two million units.58 However, the pro- 
posal was tabled before it ever reached the desks of top management 
because of negotiations for the Electric Autolite facilities. 
These negotiations were precipitated by certain events that 
occurred at Electric Autolite in the late fifties.  By then Electric 
Autolite was a large supplier of automotive parts; its sales totalled 
approximately two hundred twenty million dollars, and its assets 
amounted to about one hundred fifty million dollars.59 In addition, 
it owned "Autolite," a nationally recognized brand name, together 
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with an established nationwide  distribution organization.     It also had 
had  the Chrysler original-equipment spark plug account  since  1941. 
Other components  supplied   to Chrysler were batteries,   auto  instruments, 
die castings,   and  cable and  fractional  horsepower motors.     Although 
American Motors,   International  Harvester,   and others  continued   to pur- 
chase components   from Electric Autolite,  Chrysler was   clearly its rea- 
son  for existence.   ° 
Chrysler's  ordering,   in  1956,  of batteries  from Electric Auto- 
lite' s competitors  caused a  turn-around.     By 1960,   these rivals were 
supplying more  than  two-thirds of Chrysler's requirements.     Also, 
Chrysler had begun  to   formulate plans   for upstream integration into 
distributors,   generators,   starters,  and voltage regulators—all  of 
which had  been obtained previously from Electric Autolite. In 
addition,  Electric Autolite's management was worried  that Chrysler's 
phaseout of   these  electrical   items would be  extended  to  include  spark 
plugs.62     Economies of  scale   in  the  Fostoria plant,  Autolite's  pri- 
mary  spark  plug producing  facility,   depended on an original-equipment 
customer;   chronic  excess capacity  in  the Fostoria plant would  threat- 
en the   firm's   long  term profit  position and possibly even its  sur- 
vival.     Electric Autolite knew that   in addition  to Chrysler,   General 
Motors  produced   its  own spark plugs and Ford had  been buying  exclu- 
sively   from Champion   for half a  century.     Although American Motors 
purchased   from Electric Autolite,   it could not be  considered  to be 
a  significant buyer.     The  trade name Autolite had been raised  to 
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prominence by a multi-million dollar investment in advertising, and 
management realized that due to the structure of the industry it could 
become nearly worthless with respect to spark plugs if Electric Auto- 
lite lost the Chrysler account.  Moreover, replacement spark, plugs had 
always been carried on inventories of replacement-market distributors 
because of their original-equipment status.  With the deterioration in 
the original-equipment market, it was inevitable that Electric Autolite 
would suffer commensurate losses in the replacement market. 
Thus, the Autolite management's final decision was to search out 
new customers.  Because of the structure of the automobile market, 
Electric Autolite's choice was Ford, the one remaining nonintegrated 
producer with a significant output. Early in 1960, Autolite approached 
Ford. This eventually resulted in an agreement whereby Ford, in ex- 
change for twenty-eight million dollars, would receive the spark plug 
facility at Fostoria, together with the Autolite trade name plus one 
of six operating battery installations at Owosso, Michigan, and the 
services of a few personnel, in addition to limited distribution 
rights.63 
Entry and Exits 
There have been several firms which have left the spark plug 
industry.  Not much information is available concerning these exits, 
but a few basic facts are available." Few firms except Electric 
Autolite ventured into spark plug production after Champion and 
General Motors divided the market. None of the firms that did enter 
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ever surpassed the two per cent market share level.  Firestone Tire 
and Rubber Company, a dominant seller in the tire industry, merchan- 
dised "Firestone" replacement spark plugs for thirty-five years be- 
fore it left the industry in 1964. Although it owned some eight 
hundred accessory stores and successfully wholesaled other items to 
more than fifty thousand shops and gasoline stations, it never suc- 
ceeded in obtaining a significant share of the market.  Economies of 
scale and the OE tie, no doubt, played a critical role in its demise. 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, the largest firm in the tire indus- 
try, produced spark plugs for only three years.  Globe Union, a 
fabricator which had barely one per cent of total domestic shipments, 
withdrew in 1960.  In 1966, the firms in the industry which did not 
have substantial new-car association consisted of the following: 
1. "Atlas"—sponsored by Standard Oil Company—one and four- 
tenths per cent of all service establishments. 
2. "Prestolite" and "Allstate" of Sears, Roebuck and Company- 
one and two-tenths per cent each of all service establishments. 
3. "Riverside" of Montgomery Ward—six-tenths of one per cent of 
all service establishments. 
Several dozen other outlets belonging chiefly to hardware and discount 
chains and farm implement firms attained a combined total of two and 
four-tenths per cent.  Most of the productions for the above listed 
firms is performed by Eltra and General Battery and Ceramic. 
Present Seller Concentration 
The spark plug industry is clearly characterized by an oligo- 
polistic market structure.  Using Professor Bain's system of classifying 
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industries according to seller concentration, the industry manifests a 
very high degree of concentration.66 Owing to the extent of vertical 
integration and conglomerateness, exact measures of market shares are 
not possible; however, estimates are available. The number and size 
distribution of firms selling in the spark plug market in 1964 is 
shown in Table 2. 67 
TABLE 2 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF SELLERS IN SPARK PLUG INDUSTRY—1964 
Spark Plug Producing Firms 
Approximate Percentage Share 
of Spark Plugs Produced in 
the United States in 1964 
Champion 
General Motors 
Ford 
Eltra 
Other Firms 
(First 3 Firms) 
(First 4 Firms) 
Total 
40.0 
40.0 
26.5 
(96.5) 
1.2 
(97.7) 
2.3 
100.0 
Source:     In the Supreme Court of  the United States,  October Term, 
1970,  Motion of  the United States   to Affirm,  Ford Motor Com- 
pany v.  United States,   pp.   7-8. 
Table  2   shows  that   the three  largest sellers of spark  plugs 
accounted  for more  than ninety-five per cent of  total   industry ship- 
ments  in   1964.     In addition,   it  shows   that  the  first  four  firms were 
responsible  for approximately ninety-seven per cent of domestic ship- 
ments.    General  Motors  and   Ford not only enjoy a  dominant  position  in 
the   field of spark plug production,  but   they also hold comfortable 
positions  in  the automobile  industry as well.68    Moreover,   they produce 
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broad lines of automotive parts.     Of  the  leaders  in the  spark plug 
market, Champion  is   the only  independent which has  concentrated en- 
tirely on the production and sale of spark plugs.   '    Eltra   is  shown 
in  the table as   the  fourth member of the  industry.     It  combined with 
the   leftover  portion of the Ford-Autolite merger,  and  in  1962,   it be- 
gan producing and selling spark plugs under  the Prestolite   trade name. 
Table 2 also reveals  that  there   is a competitive  fringe of sellers   in 
the   spark plug  industry   ("other   firms").     Kahn noted in 1947  that 
approximately   forty  firms  comprised the  industry at   that   time--ten of 
those produced  complete  spark plugs.70    Hansen and  Smith in  1951  also 
calculated  the  total number  to be  forty.71    However,   a   later  source 
put   the count  at   twenty-two as  of  1971.72    Although  it  is  not  possible 
to resolve   these   inconsistencies,   it   is known  that  only  the   three 
dominant  firms   listed  in Table 2   sell   in both  the original-equipment 
and replacement markets.     In contrast,   the competitive   fringe  sells 
only   in the replacement market;   its members also produce and  sell 
other automotive   items.73    They either assemble  spark plugs   from parts 
supplied by other  firms  or  they market  complete  spark plugs   purchased 
from other  producers,  using their own brand names. 
In summary,   the structure  of the spark plug   industry   following 
the Ford-Autolite merger  remained virtually  the same as   it was  prior 
to  1961.     The only change  that occurred was   the Ford  take-over of 
Electric Autolite's  position,   the net  result being  the addition of 
Eltra  to  the  industry.     Presently,   there are   three dominant   producers 
U2 
of spark plugs in the United States--the only difference is that two 
of these firms rather than one are automobile producers.  On balance, 
the industry is very highly concentrated; the first four firms account 
for approximately ninety-seven per cent of domestic production. 
Buyer Concentration 
Another dimension of market structure that should be considered 
in our analysis is buyer concentration, the correlative to seller con- 
centration on the buyer side of the market.  Buyer concentration 
refers to the number and size distribution of the buyers who make up 
the market.7i*     It is of major importance as a dimension of the struc- 
ture of the spark plug market, because it helps to explain its pricing 
patterns.  That price is less than marginal cost is attributed to 
buyer concentration.  In order to visualize buyer concentration in the 
spark plug market, the reader must be fully cognizant of the two sub- 
markets through which automotive parts in general and spark plugs in 
particular pass en route to the final consumer:  (1) the original- 
equipment market and (2) the replacement market. Casual reference was 
previously made to these submarkets. The discussion below is intended 
to inform the reader more thoroughly. 
The Original-Equipment Market.-Spark plugs used for automotive 
purposes move through either of these submarkets dependent upon the 
type of buyer.  The original-equipment market includes direct, large 
volume transactions between automobile and spark plug producers, 
either for installation at assembly plants or for shipment to 
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franchisers to be used in their service departments. 
The original-equipment spark plug submarket is unique because 
it is an excellent example of a bilateral oligopoly in which bargain- 
ing power takes on great significance.  The three major producers sell 
to three large buyers and one small buyer. On the sellers' side of 
the market there exists an oligopoly-Champion, General Motors, and 
Ford; on the buyers' side there exists an oligopsony—General Motors, 
Ford, Chrysler, and American Motors. To be precise, the market exem- 
plifies a bilateral monopoly because General Motors and Ford sell 
essentially to themselves, and American Motors' purchases are so small 
that it cannot be considered to be an influential buyer.  Thus, the 
net result is that Champion is the seller and Chrysler is the buyer. 
The pricing structure of the market today stems from an earlier time 
period when the major sellers were not vertically integrated and there 
was a genuine bilateral oligopoly. 
The price elasticity of demand facing individual spark plug 
producers is relatively elastic.  In effect, the relatively elastic 
demand curve facing the typical spark plug producer places the typical 
spark plug buyer—the automobile producer—in a superior bargaining 
position.  It enables him to push effectively the price of original- 
equipment spark plugs below marginal cost. How is this possible?  It 
is possible for a number of reasons.  First, automobile producers do 
not recognize any significant degree of product differentiation in 
original-equipment spark plugs.  Secondly, the OE tie acts as a 
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bargaining  tool   for  automobile  producers because  spark plug producers 
have historically required  the original-equipment market  in order  to 
have  profitable  sales   in the replacement market.     Moreover,  automobile 
producers  are  potential  entrants  into  the spark plug market and,  as 
such,  are able  to extract  price concessions   from sellers.'5    Finally, 
the   fear of excess  capacity on  the part of independent  spark plug 
sellers  contributes  to  the bargaining strength of automobile producers. 
In spite of these  lopsided bargaining advantages,   supplier- 
customer relationships  in the  original-equipment market remained 
stable until   1961,   the year of the Ford-Autolite merger.    The  stabil- 
ity over  time of  these relationships can be attributed  to  the price 
remaining below marginal  cost,   thus effectively  forestalling entry. 
To  sum up,   the  essential   feature of the original-equipment mar- 
ket   is  that   it   is a bilateral oligopoly,  and bargaining power plays  a 
crucial  role  in  its  pricing structure.     Price  is   indeterminant. 
Original-equipment  spark plug prices have remained  less  than marginal 
cost  through  time  primarily because of  the bargaining power of auto- 
mobile producers.     The advantages  of product   promotion that spark plug 
producers obtain  from original-equipment  sales have  led  to profitable 
sales  in  the  replacement market.    This   feature has enabled spark plug 
producers   to  offset  their   losses  in the original-equipment market. 
The Replacement Market.-The replacement market  is  different 
from the original-equipment market because  it  is  characterized by the 
existence of a variety of mass  distributors,  which  sell automotive 
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parts in general. While only the dominant sellers supply the 
original-equipment market, all of the spark plug producers sell to the 
replacement market.  The major sellers share among themselves the 
majority of the replacement market; the smaller firms share the re- 
maining portion.76 
Replacement spark plugs can be divided into two general cate- 
gories according to the type of label they bear:  (1) the spark plug 
producer's label, and (2) the private label. The producer's label 
carries the trade name of the producer or supplier of the spark plug. 
Examples of this type are Champion, AC (General Motors), Prestolite 
(Eltra), and Autolite (now owned by Ford).  On the other hand, private 
label spark plugs carry the label of the distributor, as, for example, 
Allstate, Atlas, and Riverside. The purchasers of these private label 
spark plugs usually assume all of the distribution functions. They 
also promote these spark plugs in their own advertising campaigns. 
The demand for private label spark plugs has traditionally been 
less than the demand for spark plugs bearing producers labels.  How- 
ever, it appears that private label spark plugs are gaining importance: 
. . . forces are now at work within the spark plug market that 
may lead to its eventual deconcentration by increasing the 
number of potential customers for a new entrant into the plug 
manufacturing business and reducing the need for original 
equipment identification. Yet, at present, these forces are 
restrained more than they would otherwise be on account of 
the present oligopolistic structure of the spark plug manu- 
facturing industry.  It appears that neither AC nor Autolite 
sell private label plugs.  It is in the self-xnterest of the 
OE plug manufacturer to discourage private brand sales and to 
strengthen the OE tie.  To the extent that the spark plug manu- 
facturers are not owned by the auto makers, it seems clear that 
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they will be more favorably disposed toward private brand 
sales and will compete more vigorously for such sales.  Also, 
the potential entrant continues to have the chance to sell 
not only the private brand customer but the auto maker as 
well.77 
Replacement spark plugs are sold through several different 
channels of distribution.  These channels are shown in Table 3, and 
it represents the distribution channels of automotive replacement 
parts in general but large spark plug producers also use these same 
channels.  Although Table 3 mentions Champion only, the other two 
major suppliers use similar channels.  The smaller spark plug firms 
do not use all channels shown in the table, but, instead, their prin- 
cipal route consists of the automotive distributor-jobber-repair shop 
channel.  As a rule, they do not sell to automobile producers} how- 
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ever, they have a few oil company accounts. 
Table 3 can be used to show the relationship between the prin- 
cipal units of the replacement market. The table reveals that direct 
sales were made primarily to automotive parts distributors, oil com- 
panies, and automobile producers. These buyers resell spark plugs to 
wholesalers and/or jobbers who, in turn, sell to automotive parts 
retailers, gasoline stations, and franchised dealers.  Automotive 
parts distributors, oil companies, and automobile producers, the table 
shows, sell directly to retail outlets.  In addition, there is cross- 
selling by automotive parts distributors to oil and vehicle jobbers 
and to franchised dealers and gasoline stations.  Automotive parts 
jobbers also cross-sell to franchised dealers and gasoline stations. 
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TABLE   3 
MAJOR  CHANNELS  OF  DISTRIBUTION—SPARK  PLUGS 
Distributors 
Vehicle 
Manufacturers 
Jobber Basis 
Vehicle 
Distributor 
Car 
Dealers 
Champion Spark 
Plug Company 
Distributors 
Automotive Parts 
Jobber Basis 
Automotive Pal 
Repair Shop 
Car Owner 
Distributors 
Oil Companies 
Jobber Basis 
)il Jobber 
Service 
Stations 
Source:  Charles N. Davisson, The Marketing of Automotive Parts, 
Vol. XII, p. 632. 
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Moreover,   although Table   3 does  not  show it,   sales  are made by auto- 
motive parts  distributors  to "jobber basis  accounts" which  include 
fleet accounts,   tire distributors,  hardware concerns,   chain stores, 
79 and marine accounts. 
Product Differentiation 
The extent of product differentiation is an important factor in 
an oligopolistic industry. A business firm may be able to attract and 
maintain buyers or customers without relying on price reductions if it 
can successfully differentiate its product. Firms usually attempt to 
differentiate their products by design and quality changes and by per- 
suasive sales-promotion activities or by advertising which emphasize 
80 differences   in  the   products.0" 
Davisson's breakdown of  the "number  of size-types required  for 
coverage of automotive  applications"  is  indicative of the  extent of 
product  differentiation  in   the   industry: 
A very   limited number of   types  and sizes of  spark plugs  is 
sufficient   for  complete   coverage of all  automotive  engines. 
The  catalog of one manufacturer  lists only  32  different  plugs 
for automotive  application and  this  covers all  such engines. 
Another   lists   only  8  plugs   for coverage  of all   passenger cars 
since   1935. 
The  spark plug required  for a particular application is 
primarily a   function of  engine design and vehicle usage.     In 
the past,   differences   in engine design caused   the existence of 
two common  sizes of  spark plugs-1/2   inch and   7/8  inch.    Today 
the   14 mm.   spark plug has been adopted   for almost al     pass n- 
ger cars.     For heavy duty equipment  the   18 mm.  plug  is most 
common.     Vehicle application  tables  published by spark plug 
manufacturers  recommend a plug typed  for "normal    service only. 
Also,   these   tables  assume an engine  to be  in normal mechanical 
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condition.  "Hotter" plugs are used when service conditions 
consistently involve extremely low speeds, long periods of 
idling, start-stop work, governed speeds, or abnormally cold 
climatic conditions. This is known as light service.  "Colder" 
plugs are used when service conditions consistently involve 
high speeds, heavy loads, long upgrades, or abnormally hot cli- 
matic conditions.  This is commonly termed "severe" service. 
Also different fuels (e.g., natural gas, butane, kerosene) re- 
quire spark plugs of different heat ranges. 
Most spark plugs are fungible.  There is complete interchange- 
Qf 
ability among the spark plug lines of spark plug producers.   Each 
manufacturer produces a line sufficiently broad to service all appli- 
cations.  Each particular size and type of spark plug produced may 
have wide application and several types may adequately serve a given 
application.83 Casual observation reveals that the degree of product 
differentiation in the spark plug industry can be described as moder- 
ate.  It is based, not on physical product differences or quality 
changes, but on original-equipment status and on persuasive advertis- 
ing which seeks to inject brand awareness and brand loyalty.  The 
reason for the lack of strong product differentiation in the industry 
is reflected in the nature of spark plugs themselves. There is a 
great deal of similarity among competing brands in terms of appear- 
, design, and especially function.  Indeed, one spark plug looks ance 
much like another. 84 
ver 
Physical product differences are commonly exaggerated in ad- 
tising claims.  Sellers make persistent attempts to persuade buyers 
of the unique and superior characteristics of fundamentally similar 
products.  Spark plug firms generally promote image features; they 
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attempt to inject elements of glamour into their advertising with 
references to speed and racing.  Champion, AC, and Autolite spark 
plugs are relatively well known among consumers because they have had 
heavy promotion by their manufacturers.85  In a brand preference study 
performed by one of the spark plug producers it was revealed that con- 
sumers are aware of spark plug brands and have brand preferences. The 
study involved a survey of people who had recently purchased a new car 
of a particular make.  It asked which brand of spark plugs would be 
purchased when replacing present spark plugs.  Ninety per cent of the 
respondents specified one of the three leading brands.86 
Product differentiation in the industry may be declining as 
evidenced by the growing number of private label brands which are sold 
primarily on the basis of price and which compete with the name brands 
of the dominant sellers.87  For example, Champion presently sells 
original-equipment spark plugs to Chrysler under Chrysler's private 
brand name Mopar.  The private brand sector of the spark plug market 
will, as the district court stated, play an important role in the 
future.88 
In summary, both advertising and the sale of spark plugs as 
original equipment represent means by which the dominant sellers of 
spark plugs attempt to increase product differentiation of replace- 
ment spark plugs. The moderate degree of product differentiation 
existing in the spark plug industry is sufficient to create barriers 
to the expansion of sales of smaller spark plug firms with lesser 
known brands. 
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Condition of Entry 
Market  structure determines market  conduct  and  performance. 
The condition of entry   is an important structural   determinant  that 
helps  to   influence market conduct  and performance.    As a prerequisite 
to an understanding of   the condition of entry of new competitors   to 
the spark  plug  industry let us   familiarize ourselves with  its  defini- 
tion and measurement. 
Professor Bain  tells  us  that  the condition of entry "measures 
the height of  the barriers   to the entry of new competitors  to an 
industry—of  the disadvantages  that new sellers face  if  they try to 
compete  in  the   industry."89    He continues  in these words: 
...   the  condition of entry  refers  to  the extent  to which,   in 
the  long  run,   established firms can elevate their  selling 
prices  above  the minimal  average costs of production and dis- 
tribution   .   .   .  without   inducing potential  entrants  to enter 
the  industry.90 
The highest   selling price,   then,   that  established  sellers   in an  indus- 
try can persistently charge without attracting new entry Bain calls 
the maximum entry-forestalling price.    Thus,   the condition of entry  is 
quantified "numerically  as   the  percentage by which  the maximum entry- 
forestalling price  exceeds  the minimum attainable  average cost of 
established   firms."91 
Can we  numerically measure  the condition of entry  in the spark 
plug industry?    Unfortunately,  a precise measurement  is not  possible 
because the maximum entry-forestalling price   is not available,  and 
moreover,   no  systematic body of data  is available  that will  generate 
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such a measurement.  However, the facts reveal that through the years 
an entry-forestalling price less than marginal cost has been charged 
by spark plug suppliers in response to automobile producers' latent 
threats of entry.^2 Thus, there has not been one successful new en- 
trant to the industry since Autolite's entry in 1936.93 
Casual observations, based on limited information, concerning 
the barriers to entry in the spark plug industry can be made.  That 
the market structure falls into Bain's highly concentrated category, 
typified by a dominance of three or four sellers with a competitive 
fringe, is indicative of significant barriers to entry.  The chief 
barriers to entry in the industry seem to be:  (1) buyer concentration; 
(2) the OE tie; (3) price discrimination (to be discussed under market 
conduct); and (4) economies of scale.  Spark plug technology plays a 
minor role.  Concerning it, Crandall says, "(Spark plug technology) is 
alien to that which is primary in the automobile industry, i.e., metal 
fabrication.' 
The nature of the spark plug market itself has been instru- 
mental as a barrier to entry.  The OE tie has made status as an 
original-equipment supplier a prerequisite for any appreciable parti- 
cipation in the replacement market.  Furthermore, a recoupment in the 
replacement market is a prerequisite for profitable operations in both 
markets.  The original-equipment market has historically been the main 
artery to the replacement market. The experiences of Firestone, 
Goodyear, and Globe Union illustrate the difficulties which a firm 
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attempting entry into the replacement market only would encounter.95 
The inability to overcome the OE tie resulted in a lack of consumer 
acceptance of new and consequently unknown spark plugs. This in turn 
resulted in market shares insufficient to support large scale produc- 
tion. In contrast, General Motors and Champion gained an early 
advantage in the replacement market by the appearance of their plugs 
as original equipment on General Motors and Ford cars.  Original- 
equipment status made for continued success for Champion throughout 
the 1960s even though it lost the Ford account in 1961. 
Discriminatory pricing has also been operative as a barrier to 
entry. The OE tie requires that a firm operate according to a policy 
of discriminatory pricing to the original-equipment market in order 
to sell profitably in the replacement market.97 Thus, the inter- 
connection between the two markets has helped to make a potential en- 
trant follow the established pattern of price differentials. 
Not much is available about economies of scale as a barrier to 
entry because the necessary data is simply nonobtainable. Kahn noted: 
"The anxiety of the smaller independent automobile manufacturers sug- 
gests that there are significant economies of scale, which makes it 
all the more likely that Ford or Chrysler would not limit themselves 
to production of plugs for their own use."98 Bain agrees that scale 
economies are relatively important in automobile component production. 
On balance, the interconnection between the original-equipment and re- 
placement markets has necessitated entry into both markets at probably 
99 
54 
a larger scale than would be necessary if entry were Initiated only 
into the replacement market. 
Summarizing, then, barriers to effective new entry to the spark 
plug industry seem very high.  Large spark plug producers enjoy pro- 
duct differentiation advantages based on participation in the ori- 
ginal-equipment market and on consumer advertising.  Participation in 
the original-equipment market carries advantages of prestige and 
advertising; these work to enhance established sellers' positions in 
the profitable replacement market.  Economies of scale may play a role 
in preventing entry, although the magnitude of these scale economies 
is unknown.  The difficulty of establishing a distribution network has 
probably contributed to some extent to the entry barriers in the spark 
plug industry.  The growth of private label sales may play a key role 
in lowering some of these barriers in the future, but for the present 
time private label accounts are probably less profitable than others. 
Market Conduct 
A comprehensive study of the spark plug industry or any indus- 
try would be incomplete without an analysis of market conduct. Market 
conduct is all-inclusive covering every dimension of business policy. 
It involves the character of pricing policies as well as other related 
market policies adopted by industry sellers.  It also asks the ques- 
tion:  What is the extent of interseller and interbuyer coordination? 
It seeks to ascertain whether there is a pattern of collusion with 
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respect to price-output decisions in the industry or whether there is 
independent action and reaction on the part of the sellers. Further- 
more, it asks what are the motivations and objectives of the firms in 
the industry. Does joint-profit maximization exist or is independent 
maximization of profits the rule? In essence, market conduct includes 
all acts, practices, and procedures as well as motivations that the 
sellers in the industry choose in determining business policy. 
Owing to the vertical integration of General Motors, the high 
seller and buyer concentration and the OE tie, the most distinguishing 
conduct characteristic in the spark plug industry is price discrimina- 
tion in the original-equipment and replacement markets.  The question 
of coordination does not take on any significance in the original- 
equipment market; it is of interest only in the replacement market. 
Price in this market is much greater than the competitive price.  Be- 
cause of the OE tie, the original-equipment seller is able to advance 
price to an entry-forestalling level.  In this case it also has to be 
a level which protects the market share from encroachment by the com- 
petitive fringe.  The OE tie acts like price-discrimination in deter- 
mining the limit price.  In essence, a limit pricing behavior model 
is evident in the spark plug industry. 
A Federal Trade Commission decision was responsible for invit- 
ing this discriminatory pricing behavior.  In proceedings against the 
major spark plug producers in 1947 and 1948, complaints were issued 
against Champion, General Motors, and Electric Autolite by the Federal 
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Trade Commission alleging price discrimination in violation of the 
Robinson-Patman Act.  The trial revealed substantial differentials in 
the prices charged by these producers for spark plugs directed to the 
original-equipment market and those sold to the replacement market. 
Table 4 presents the pricing schedule of Champion as exhibited during 
the proceedings.  It was determined by the trial examiner that the 
invoice prices to the automobile producers for original use and re- 
placement spark plugs were misleading; instead, he took a weighted 
average of the two classes and found that Ford was receiving replace- 
ment spark plugs from Champion at a price of approximately ten cents 
below the price charged to Champion's distributors.  However, the 
Commission overruled the trial examiner and concluded that since the 
two markets were distinct the two prices should not have been aver- 
aged. 
Thus, the Federal Trade Commission ruling declared that the 
original-equipment and replacement markets were separate and distinct. 
This decision was of utmost importance in establishing the institu- 
tional and legal characteristics of market conduct in the spark plug 
industry.  Owing to the Robinson-Patman Act, buyers in the original- 
equipment market must receive approximately uniform original-equipment 
prices (represented as P0) and buyers in the replacement market must 
receive approximately uniform replacement prices (represented as Pr). 
In effect, the ruling opened the door to massive price discrimination 
taking the form Po/MC0<Pr/MCr.  It insured that the market conduct 
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TABLE 4 
PRICES  AND  DISCOUNTS  OF THE  CHAMPION  SPARK  PLUG  COMPANY,   1947 
Auto Manufacturers 
Ford 
Studebaker,   Hudson, 
Packard 
John Deere Tractor 
Original  equipment 
Replacement 
Original  equipment 
Replacement 
Original  equipment 
Replacement 
Regular Automotive Wholesale Distributors 
Invoice 
Less   107. 
Less  57. on sales   to approved wholesalers  and  jobbers 
Direct Account  Distributors   (Oil Companies,   etc.) 
A. Atlas  Supply and Socony-Vacuum: 
Invoice 
Less   107. and   107. 
B. Others: 
Invoice 
Less   107. 
Less   57. on  sales   to  approved wholesalers and jobbers 
(a discount  available but  seldom used because   these 
buyers   did not usually  "job"  sales  to others) 
Distributors'   Prices   to Accounts of the  Following Types: 
Jobber Basis   (sales   to approved  jobber  through 
distributor) 
"C"  Fleet  Basis   (sales   to fleet owners  of 500 or 
more  vehicles   through distributors) 
5,000 plug basis   (discount eliminated January  1, 
Fleet  basis   (discount  eliminated January   I,   1948) 
Fair Trade  price  to retailers 
All   prices  subject   to a 27. cash discount 
6 cents 
22 
6 
24 
6 
26.1 
29 cents 
26.1 
24.65 
29 cents 
23 49 
29 cents 
26 1 
24.65 
29 cents 
29 
32 
32 
36 
Source:     Harry Hanson and Marcell  Smith,  "The ChatnP^"C^; 
is Competition?"  »—■"j Business  Review, XXIX  (May, 
p.   90,   Exhibit  I. 
What 
1951), 
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of spark plug sellers  and  the  dominant  buyers  would  result  in price 
discrimination. 
The nature of market conduct can be represented by a  limit price 
discrimination model  of  dynamic  long-run profit maximizing behavior. 
However,  because  of a   lack of data,  all   that we are able  to do  is  de- 
pict a static   picture of Champion at a  point  in time prior to  the 
Ford-Autolite merger.     Before  1961   there was a  set  of prices,   PQ,   Pr, 
and Pw,  which Champion  set  in a  fashion designed  to   forestall entry 
into the market.     The price Pw represents  the weighted average price 
of original-use and  replacement-use purchases according to the rela- 
tive  frequency of demand charged  to Ford:     Pw=Po
(V'PrQr/|VH3r• 
Consider Figure  1. 
Price 
AC=MC 
Quantity 
Figure  1 
Champion's Static Position 
It shows Champion's  total   demand curve and the demand curve 
relative  to  Ford.     It  shows  that  Ford received  a  lower price  in the  ori- 
ginal-equipment market   (P0)   relative  to  the price  it  received  in the 
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replacement market   (Pr).     It  also shows  that  the only meaningful  price 
to Ford  for  spark plugs was  Pw.     Even though Champion sustained   losses 
in the original-equipment market   its overall operations were  success- 
ful  because of  the higher  Pr.     The  shaded portion shows   the  excess 
profits going  to Champion   from overall operations  including all buyers 
in  the market;   Vw
l  represents  the  total weighted average price to  all 
buyers. 
The discriminatory pricing of Champion is illustrated in 
Table 4.  Assuming Ford's purchases to be divided equally between the 
original-equipment market and the replacement market, Table 4 shows 
that Pw for Ford in 1947 was fourteen cents (.50(.60) + .50(.22)).  In 
the event that Ford increased its purchases of replacement spark plugs 
at the expense of original-use purchases, then, Champion could continue 
to maintain P^.14 by adjusting P0 but keeping Pr at the same level. 
Assume that Ford's replacement plug purchases increased from fifty per 
cent to sixty per cent of its total requirements and its original- 
equipment plug purchases fell from fifty per cent to forty per cent of 
total requirements.  Then, in order to maintain P„=$.14, Champion 
would have to set P0 equal to two cents (.40x + .60(.22)=.14 and x =.02) 
The fact that Champion continued to sell plugs to Ford at six cents 
despite rising costs shows, to a certain extent, that it did moderate 
original-equipment spark plug prices while increasing replacement 
spark plug prices.  Champion's intent was to sustain a weighted aver- 
age price at or below marginal cost in order to forestall Ford's 
potential entry.100 
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The  reader may be wondering,   in view of the  foregoing, why Ford 
chose to  purchase  Electric Autolite's  spark plug facilities,   especial- 
ly since  it could  continue  to  purchase spark plugs at  less  than mar- 
ginal cost.     In the   first  part of this thesis we provided one part of 
the answer.     Ford   sought  to  increase  its  declining share of the  lucra- 
tive replacement market.     Crandall  presents  an even more interesting 
answer in his   dissertation: 
In   the earliest days  of the motor-vehicle industry,   Ford's 
demand   for   spark plugs was  primarily for original equipment. 
In ensuing years,  however,   Ford and other major  assemblers 
developed very   large replacement  demand through  their dealer- 
ships.     More recently,   Ford and Chrysler have emulated General 
Motors'   policy  of developing replacement-parts demand  in the 
non-dealer markets.     Thus,   Ford's ratio of replacement  spark 
plug purchases   to original-equipment  purchases  should have  in- 
creased markedly since   1947.     It   is distinctly possible that 
Champion,   their primary supplier,   found  it  impossible  to cope 
with   large  disparities   in those ratios  among assemblers. 
Crandall's   thoughts are consistent with the discriminatory 
pricing behavior of Champion previously discussed. 
We  reach  the conclusion,   then,   that Champion's  discriminatory 
pricing policy was  designed  to set  P0  low enough to deter  large-scale 
entrants  such  as  Ford  from entering  the market.    Moreover,   at the 
same  time   it  set  Pr  at  the maximum entry  forestalling  level   in order 
to deter  small-scale entry  (competitive  fringe).    The competitive 
fringe was  effectively deterred because of the entry barriers we men- 
tioned earlier. 
Kahn has   formulated a Bain-type,   limit-price hypothesis which 
is crucial   for  an understanding of market  conduct  in the spark plug 
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industry. Crandall used it to explain the limit to backward integra- 
tion into component manufacture by automobile producers. It suggests 
a modus operand! for large-scale, vertically integrated firms selling 
in the spark plug market.     The hypothesis as  stated by Kahn: 
Assume a monopolist who  is  threatened with entry by one of 
his  large buyers but  is  relatively protected against entry by 
other purchasers  and outsiders.     It may be  to his benefit in 
such a situation to offer an entry-forestalling discriminatory 
price  to  the  potential  entrant—assuming that he can effectively 
divide   the market—in order  to retain his  power over price  in 
the rest  of  the market.     He will   thus   forestall entry by sepa- 
rating out  the potential  entrant, maintaining or possibly rais- 
ing the  existing price  to his other purchasers.     In effect,   the 
seller who now lacks   sufficient monopoly power over price in 
the broader market because of the potentiality of entry, re- 
tains his  power over  price  in the narrower market by separating 
out the potential  entrant.     This hypothesis assumes,   of course, 
a potential   entrant who  is  primarily  concerned with receiving 
its own requirements cheaply and  is not  interested  in obtaining 
a share of the monopoly  profit which  can be exacted  from the 
rest of the market,   but who on the  other hand,   if forced to en- 
ter, will not   limit   itself  to  production of  its  ownneeds^in 
order to achieve  the necessary economies  of production. 
We  can employ  another diagram to aid us   in understanding why 
P0 is  lower than Pr.
1Q3     In  Figure 2,   DL  and D2  represent   the short-run 
and  long-run demand curves  of  spark plugs   for Champion at a  point   in 
time prior  to   1961.     At   price 0Po,   Ford purchases  quantity OQ of  spark 
plugs  for original-equipment use.     If Champion were  to raise the price 
to 0Po\   Ford would buy  quantity OQ
1   in the short-run.     However,   in 
the  long-run,   demand curve D2   is relevant  and  at price 0Po'   quantity 
demanded by  Ford would   fall  to zero.     Kahn explains  this  as  follows: 
...  not  only would Champion lose about  one-sixth «U»mjlm. 
but it would   face a   formidable new rivalry frj    other five 
sixths,   since  Ford would have  the good will  adhering 
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plugs  from exclusive use  in new cars  and  from the extensive  pro- 
motional  activity  incident  of Ford's  dealer-service program.^4 
Price 
Champion's short-run 
demand curve 
Champion's long-run 
demand curve 
Quantity 
Figure 2 
Champion's Short and Long-run Demand Curves 
Ford's time adjustment in going from DL to D2 in response to 
the price increase would take the necessary time period to integrate 
backward into spark plug production. 
In summary, then, Champion's strategy with Ford prior to the 
Ford-Autolite merger had been to forego maximization of short-run 
profits in the original-equipment market and sell at or below cost in 
order to impede Ford from entering the market and sharing in the pro- 
fitable replacement market.  It recouped its losses by boosting prices 
in the replacement market.  In effect, it priced in the replacement 
market to subsidize operations in the original-equipment market. 
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Champion's   ten year  summary  seems  to indicate that profits were maxi- 
mized in  the  long-run.     Ford continued  to purchase spark plugs   from 
Champion for six cents  each  because of  the cost  savings associated 
with buying rather than internally producing them itself;   in the   long- 
run,   the six cent price may have been below long-run average cost of 
production.    Moreover,   in Kahn's words: 
The ability  to give  an "entry-forestalling"  price  (at or below 
actual  cost)   to potential   entrants  is  indicative of the existence 
of substantial monopoly profits which are being protected.     For 
only the price granted  the  potential entrant  is governed by  the 
competition of new sources of supply;   the difference between  the 
two prices   suggests  the amount of monopoly profit  embodied   in the 
higher price.*06 
In conclusion,   it must be emphasized  that  the market conduct 
that occurs   in the  spark plug industry—the differential  pricing of 
original  and  replacement  equipment—is  also  found generally in the sale 
of most automotive parts.     Our  limit-price hypothesis  is not opera- 
tional without more  conclusive data with which  to  test   it.     However, 
the empirical  evidence  in the  industry  seems  to  support  the hypothesis; 
it certainly does not disprove  it. 
Market   Performance 
Bain  tells us  that market  performance  is   the end result of the 
market conduct of buyers  and sellers  in an industry.     It   includes 
several  dimensions:     (1)   technical efficiency;   (2)  allocative effi- 
ciency;   (3)   size of selling costs;   (4)   technological   progressiveness; 
(5) product  quality;   (6)   conservation,   and   (7)   price  flexibility 
107 
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Unfortunately,   since  the  empirical  data of the  spark plug industry is 
scant, we are not   in a  position to make a  qualitative judgment about 
all of these dimensions of market  performance.     However,  we can evalu- 
ate technical  efficiency,   allocative efficiency,   the size of sales 
promotion costs,   and  price   flexibility. 
Technical   efficiency  refers   to the extent to which the industry 
firms approach  or  attain optimal   economies of scale  in production.     In 
addition,   it  pertains   to  the extent  to which the firms  in the industry 
approximate optimal  degrees  of vertical   integration of successive pro- 
ductive stages.108    With  respect  to  the  former, we can say that there 
may be significant  economies  of  scale present  in the  spark plug indus- 
try.    Kahn hinted  at   this   in his  analysis and we referred  to it ear- 
lier.     Ford and General Motors  ownership of spark plug facilities 
guarantees   their  supply of original-equipment requirements;  however, 
the  fact   that  both  firms  produce  for and  sell   in the replacement mar- 
ket  suggests   that   economies  of  scale dictate the replacement market as 
a technical   sine qua non.     Moreover,  with respect to optimal  degrees 
su 
f vertical   integration,   the  three major  sellers of spark plugs are 
fficiently vertically   integrated   to the  extent to  take advantage of 
economies  of  scale. 
The  size of an  industry's output  as  judged by  the  relationship 
of its  long-run  selling  prices  to   its  long-run marginal  cost of pro- 
duction is  known as  allocative efficiency.     Profit rates  are the best 
measure of allocative  efficiency but,   unfortunately there   is no 
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available data on profit  rates   in the  spark plug  industry.     On the 
other hand,  we can get  an idea of industry  profit  rates  by observing 
the Annual Report of Champion.     A ten year  review of Champion's   finan- 
cial operations   is   listed below. 
Net Earnings* 
$29,802 
27,429 
26,186 
24,552 
21,409 
18,961 
16,834 
15,142 
14,533 
14,829 
* Thousands  of Dollars 
Source:     Annual  Report of Champion Spark Plug Corporation,   1970,  p.   17. 
Computing the rate earned on stockholders'   equity,  we  find the 
following results: 
Year Net Earnings/Stockholders'   Equity 
Year Net  Sales* 
1970 $290,169 
1969 277,196 
1968 253,174 
1967 204,681 
1966 163,567 
1965 139,511 
1964 128,617 
1963 112,073 
1962 102,805 
1961 97,372 
Stockholders' 
Equity* Earnings/Shares 
$163,100 $2.39 
147,870 2.24 
128,835 2.14 
116,590 2.01 
100,082 1.79 
91,627 1.58 
85,577 1.40 
80,911 1.26 
76,638 1.21 
73,383 1.23 
1970 
1969 
1968 
1967 
1966 
1965 
1964 
1963 
1962 
1961 
18.3 
18.5 
20.3 
21.1 
21.4 
20.7 
19.7 
18.7 
19.0 
20.2 
Thus, it can be seen that the overall operations of Champion 
have been quite successful even after it lost the Ford account in 1961. 
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That Kahn has  pointed out  the existence of monopoly rents   in the re- 
placement market would  indicate Champion's  selling price  in that 
market to be  excessive.     This   is  true because of the  profitability of 
Champion's overall  operations  in spite of unprofitable original- 
equipment   sales.     Therefore,   it would seem that Champion's output  is 
less than optimum,   a  rate  that   is associated with a misallocation of 
resources. 
Another aspect of  the market  performance of the spark plug 
industry subject   to observation  is   the magnitude of costs  incurred for 
sales promotion.     It would probably be safe  to conclude that  the sales 
promotion activities  of the   large  spark plug sellers  are more of a 
persuasive rather  than an informative nature.    The reader  is referred 
to the section on  product  differentiation  for a discussion of this 
type of advertising.     Our general   impression  is  that a substantial 
portion of all  sales   promotion costs of the  three major sellers  in the 
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spark plug industry  is  socially wasteful   in character. 
Price  uniformity  in  the  spark plug  industry has usually been 
the  rule  rather  than  the exception.     Kahn has  observed  that  prices are 
identical: 
In 1947 the three major producers «^*l~d1""""
1
$
PgCeS 
of $.65 per plug to thj.consumer wit . spec aerate ofj.59^ 
gins and almost identical prices were quoted OH MlM to 0 
companies, car manufacturers, and other dxrectpurch.-«r.. 
maior oroducers apparently recognized that pr « competiti 
tion 
major  producers  apparently recogni«-   r;'re
r:7tuation and empha- 
would be unwise   in  the existing competitive sltuatio 
sized various   forms of non-price competition. 
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In conclusion,   our evidence concerning the market  performance 
is  scarce.     However,  our observations on the dimensions of performance 
that are available   lead us   to believe  that   the market performance of 
the  spark  plug  industry   is  consistent with the high degree of concen- 
tration that   is  exhibited by  the  industry. 
Summary 
We have attempted  an analysis of  the spark plug industry using 
the industrial  organization  framework in order to enable us  to evalu- 
ate  the Ford-Autolite merger  in  its   logical  context.    Our  findings on 
the major  dimensions,   especially market  structure, will shed  light on 
the district   court's  ruling  in  the case.     In the   fourth chapter we 
will  advance  a  limit  pricing model,   the basis of which will rest on 
the market  structure of  the  spark plug  industry and the potential com- 
petition doctrine.     The market  structure,   conduct and performance as- 
pects of  this   chapter wi] 1  be  essential   to and understanding of  the 
content of  the   fourth chapter. 
68 
IV.    THE FORD-AUTOLITE MERGER 
In  this   chapter we  shall  be concerned with the district  court 
proceedings  against  the Ford-Autolite merger,   including the arguments 
of the parties   to  the   suit and the  final  decision of the court.     Pub- 
lic policy   toward vertical   integration will  also be discussed.     In 
addition,   we   shall  present  a theoretical model with which we shall 
use as a basis  to analyze  the merger. 
The Contention of the  Parties 
The Government's Argument 
The  government's argument  before  the district  court was basi- 
cally divided   into  two parts:     (1)   argument   involving the potential 
competition doctrine,   and  (2)  argument  involving foreclosure  theory. 
Each part   is  discussed below. 
The   first  part  dealt with  Ford's  position as a potential  com- 
petitor.     It was  argued by  the government  that  the effect of Ford's 
acquisition of Electric Autolite was  the removal of a  firm from the 
spark plug market,  whose presence as a potential  competitor had pro- 
vided "an  incentive  to competition."    The  argument relied heavily on 
the  potential   competition doctrine as  it was applied in previous 
antitrust   suits.     These are also discussed below. 
The  second  part of  the government's  argument  involved  the 
foreclosure of  independent  spark plug producers  from selling to Ford. 
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The government  contended  that  the merger not only foreclosed actual 
competitors,   but   potential   spark plug producers were also prevented 
from selling  to  Ford.     More  specifically,   it argued  that Ford's post- 
merger position  as a vertically-integrated  spark plug producer fore- 
closed the   total   spark plug market by nine and six-tenths  per cent or 
the amount  of its  prior   industry purchases.111-    Thus,   the government 
contended  that  existing  producers,   as well  as  potential entrants, were 
denied an opportunity   to  try to obtain Ford as a purchaser of spark 
plugs, an incentive which  supposedly would have  induced other  spark 
plug makers   to work a   change which would have conceivably  led  to the 
deconcentration of a   tight  oligopolistic  industry.    Antitrust cases 
involving  foreclosure   theory are  also discussed below. 
Two judicial  decrees  enunciated by  the  Supreme Court were cited 
by  the government  as  having relevance   to  the Ford-Autolite merger.11 
In U.   S.  v.   Philadelphia National  Bank,   the Court  said  that where con- 
centration  is  already  at  a  high   level,   even slight  increases must be 
prevented.     In Brown  Shoe Co.   v.  U.   S.,   the ruling was   that where 
there  is a   strong  trend   toward oligopoly,   further  tendencies   in that 
direction are   to   be  curbed  in their   incipiency, whatever  the number, 
or vigor,   of remaining competitors. 
Ford's Argument 
Ford  presented  an "upward  competition" defense  to  the district 
court.     It   contended   that  the effect of  the merger was  to make Ford 
a more effective  competitor against General Motors and Champion than 
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Electric Autolite  alone had been.     The acquisition,   Ford maintained, 
was justified because   it produced more effective competition in the 
spark plug market. 
The District Court's Decision 
The  district  court  ruled  in  favor of the government and held 
that Ford's   acquisition of Electric-Autolite violated  Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act.     The  decision maintained that  the acquisition would have 
two principal   adverse  effects  upon spark plug competition:113    (1)  the 
elimination of Ford as  a  potential   entrant  in  the spark plug market, 
as well as   the "competitive   force"  that  Ford exerted on the market, 
and (2) an effective raising of the barriers   to entry  in the spark 
plug market. 
The Decision on  the Merits 
The   court   concluded  that  Ford was  a potential  entrant  to  the 
spark plug market   and   that   it was  Ford's  actual  presence at the edge 
of that market  that had a substantial  influence  on the competitive 
behavior of  the  existing spark plug producers.     In addition,   it  found 
that Ford had been Champion's   largest  customer,   and as  such exerted 
substantial   pressures  on Champion to compete vigorously  for  its busi- 
ness.    Moreover,   it  concluded  that  Ford's  influence supposedly car- 
ried over  into  the entire replacement market.     This "moderating 
effect" was   supposedly operative because Champion was   forced  to make 
concessions   to  Ford on  sales  for redistribution to the  replacement 
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market vis-a-vis  Ford's  constant  threat of upstream vertical   integra- 
tion.    Ford's   influence on Champion was  exercised by  its  large spark 
plug purchases which  forced Champion to exercise pricing restraint   in 
order to  avoid   the   loss  of  Ford as  its  predominant customer.     Since 
the Robinson-Patman Act  insured Ford's  replacement market competitors 
identical  pricing  patterns,   Champion's  spark plug prices  to other 
firms were  supposedly depressed below the norm.     In turn,  Champion s 
policies   strongly  influenced other spark plug producers and suppliers 
because it was   the  dominant member of the oligopoly and controlled 
approximately  one-half of  the market.     The court's conclusion was 
expressed  in  these words: 
While   Ford was  able   to check any avarice on the part of Cham- 
pion,   there  is now no  similar counter-balance as   to Ford,  which 
will  not   be disengaged   regardless how extravagant  its replacement 
price may  become.   ...     The  ideal  is broad competition in all  of 
its ramifications and,  where this   is in the more atomistic  forms 
seems  impossible,   the goal   is to  salvage what remains.     Here 
prior  to   1961,   defendant helped mollify the evils of oligopoly. 
The Potential  Competition Doctrine 
In its   decision,   the  court  followed  the precedent which was 
established   in U.   S.  v.   Pern-01 in Chemical Co.,   378 U.   S.   158 (1964). 
In the words  of  the district  court: 
An  interested  firm on  the outside has a  twofold significance. 
It may  some day  go  in and set the stage  for noticeable decon- 
centration.     While  it merely stays near  the edge,   It   is • 
deterrent   to current  competitors.   .   .   .     This was  Ford uniquely, 
as both a prime  candidate to manufacture and the major customer 
of the dominant member of the oligopoly. 
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Even  though   the Justice  Department  lost  the Penn-Olin suit,   it 
is still  considered  to have established  a  firm precedent  for prevent- 
ing mergers  and joint ventures  consummated by potential entrants   into 
oligopolistic markets.116    The  case   involved  two chemical   firms, 
Pennsalt Chemical  Company  and 01 in Mathieson Chemical Corporation. 
Pennsalt was  an active producer of a  paper pulp bleaching agent known 
as  sodium chlorate,   operated a plant  in  Portland, Oregon,  and served 
the  local market while 01 in Mathieson used  sodium chlorate primarily 
as an intermediate   product  purchasing it   directly  from other  firms. 
The suit was   initiated  after  the  two  firms   formed Penn-Olin for the 
purpose of exploiting the rapidly expanding market  in the southeastern 
part of  the United  States.     Each  firm had previously considered enter- 
ing that market  independently  in the  1950's.     The result of  the joint 
venture was  that  one year  after   its   formation it controlled  twenty- 
eight per cent  of  all   southeastern United  States  sodium chlorate 
production capacity.11-' 
The district  court   ruled  against   the government on the grounds 
that competition was not   substantially  lessened because of  the un- 
likely probability  of both   firms  entering  the market  independently. 
The Supreme Court,   however,   ruled that the district court had used 
the wrong criteria: 
We believe  that   the court  erred in this regard.     Certainly 
the  sole   till  wouldZt be   the  probability that botl; companies 
would have entered  the market.     Nor would ^e consideration 
limited  to  the   probability  that one entered alone.    There 
still  remained   for consideration  the   fact   that  *£n-J"n 
eliminated  the   potential  competition of the corporation that 
73 
might have remained at the edge of the market, continually 
threatening to enter.  Just as a merger eliminates actual 
competition, this joint venture may well foreclose any pros- 
pect of competition between Olin and Pennsalt in the relevant 
sodium chlorate market.  The difference, of course, is that 
the merger's foreclosure is present while the joint venture's 
is prospective.  Nevertheless, "(p)otential competition . . . 
as a substitute for . . . (actual competition) may restrain 
producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or under- 
paying those from whom they buy. . . .  Potential competition, 
insofar as the threat survives (as it would have here in the 
absence of Penn-Olin), may compensate in part for the imper- 
fection characteristic of actual competition in the great 
majority of competitive markets."  . . .  Potential competi- 
tion cannot be put to a subjective test.  It is not "suscep- 
tible of a ready and precise answer."  ... The existence of 
an aggressive, well equipped and well financed corporation 
engaged in the same or related lines of commerce waiting 
anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a sub- 
stantial incentive to competition which cannot be under- 
estimated.  Witness the expansion undertaken by Hooker and 
American Potash as soon as they heard of the interest of Olin 
Mathieson and of Pennsalt in southeastern territory. This 
same situation might well have come about had either Olin or 
Pennsalt entered the relevant market alone and the other re- 
mained aloof watching developments. 
The case was directed back to the district court, which found 
again that independent entry by either of the two firms was highly 
improbable.  A second appeal to the Supreme Court guaranteed the con- 
tinuing existence of Penn-Olin via a four-four division by the judges 
on overturning the lower court's decision. 
in effect, what the district court said about the Ford-Autolite 
merger was that it posed a significant threat to the competitive 
structure of the spark plug market in the same fashion as the Penn- 
Olin joint-venture affected the southeastern sodium chlorate market. 
Ford's position at the edge of the spark plug market virtually paral- 
leled that of either Pennsalt or Olin if one had entered the sodium 
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chlorate market  and   the other had remained on the periphery.     The 
Supreme Court had this   to  say about the Penn-Olin joint-venture: 
We  do not,   of course,  know for certain what would have 
happened   if the  "joint venture" had not materialized.     But 
we do know  that  Section 7  deals  only with probabilities, 
not certainties.     We  know that  the  interest of each company 
in the project was   lively,   that one if not both of them 
would probably have  entered   that market,   and that even if 
only one had entered at  the beginning the presence of the 
other on  the periphery would  in all   likelihood have been a 
potent  competitive   factor."" 
A somewhat  similar  situation existed  in U.   S.  v.  El  Paso Natu- 
ral Gas Company  et  al,   376 U.   S.   651   (1964),   another antitrust case 
that contributed  to   the  precedent  for  the potential competition doc- 
trine and  invoked by   the  court   in the  Ford-Autolite merger.     The case 
involved a merger between El  Paso Natural Gas Company,   a  seller of 
industrial  gas   in California,   and Pacific Northwest  Pipeline Corpora- 
tion,   an outside   firm that had  extensive natural  gas  reserves  in New 
Mexico and Western Canada  and also was  a potential  entrant  in the 
California natural  gas market.     The merger was  ruled  illegal  by  the 
Court  in violation of Section  7  of  the Clayton Act.    The decision was 
based on the elimination of a substantial  potential competitor- 
Pacific Northwest.     The Court  considered  the relevant criteria to be 
"the nearness  of  the absorbed company  to  (the market),   that company's 
, , "120    In 
eagerness   to enter that market,   its  resourcefulness.   .   .   . 
this case   the Court  observed,   "We would have to wear blinders not   to 
see that   the mere efforts  of Pacific Northwest  to get   into  the 
California market,   though unsuccessful, had a  powerful   influence on 
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El Paso's  business   attitudes  within the  State."121 
The Penn-Olin and El   Paso  litigation were considered by many 
19 9 
economists   to be   antitrust  cases  that  involved  landmark decisions. 
It  is certain  that   they were   landmark decisions with respect to the 
potential   competition  doctrine.     Moreover,   they were  influential  in 
the decision of  the district  court concerning the Ford-Autolite 
merger. 
Another  significant  ruling that was handed down by the Supreme 
Court involving potential   competition came  in Federal Trade Commis- 
sion v.   Proctor  and Gamble Company et  al,   87 S Ct   1224,   1230 (1967). 
Proctor and Gamble,   a manufacturer of soap and detergents,   led the 
United States   in   sales  of  soaps  and detergents at  the   time of the 
Federal Trade Commission  suit.     Chlorox Chemical Company was a domi- 
nate firm in  the  household  liquid bleach  industry accounting for 
nearly half of  industry  sales.123    Proctor  and Gamble's acquisition 
of Chlorox led  to   the  challenge by  the  Federal Trade Commission.    The 
Commission and   the Circuit Court's   findings were reversed by the 
Supreme Court  which  dissolved  the merger on  three grounds:     (1)  the 
fact  that  Proctor   and Gamble  was   the most   likely entrant  into the 
household  liquid   bleach market;   (2)   the possibility of predatory pric- 
ing on the  part  of  Proctor  and Gamble;   (3)   the tendency of  the acqui- 
sition to raise   the barriers   to entry by bolstering Chlorox's 
advertising  power. 12*    The   Court  found Proctor and Gamble  to be an 
effective  potential  competitor:     "It  is  clear that the existence of 
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Proctor at   the edge  of the   industry exerted considerable influence on 
the market."125 
The   potential  competition doctrine was also used  in March of 
1969 by the Nixon administration when it initiated  its   first major 
antitrust  action against conglomerate mergers.     The acquisition of 
Jones and Laughlin  Steel  Corporation by the conglomerate Ling-Temco- 
Vought was used as  a   test  case  by  the Justice Department to determine 
whether or not   Section 7 of  the Clayton Act applied to  conglomerate 
mergers as well  as   those of  the horizontal  and vertical  type.    The 
suit challenged   the  acquisition on the grounds  that Ling-Temco-Vought 
and Jones   and Laughlin were  potential,  direct competitors  in certain 
lines of business   through   internal  expansion.    The case was  settled in 
June,   1970,   when a   Federal   Judge approved a  settlement  that  required 
Ling-Temco-Vought  either   to divest  itself of Jones and Laughlin or to 
divest  itself of  interests   in two of  its  subsidiaries.     Ling-Temco- 
Vought  indicated at   that   time  that  it  planned to keep Jones  and 
Laughlin.126 
Foreclosure Theory 
The  anticompetitive  effects of foreclosure have been explained 
in many court  cases   concerning antitrust violations.12?    They were 
most clearly  stated   in  the   landmark decision of Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States.   370 U.S.   294,   323-324,   the Supreme Court's only com-^ 
prehensive decision  in reference to vertical mergers.     In the Court's 
own words: 
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The primary vice of a vertical merger or other arrangement tying 
a customer   to a  supplier  is   that,  by foreclosing the competitors 
of either party  from a   segment of  the market otherwise open to 
them,   the  arrangement may act as a "clog on competition"   .   .   . 
which  "deprive(s)   .   .   .   rivals of a  fair opportunity to compete." 
.   .   .     Every  extended vertical arrangement by  its very nature,   for 
at least  a  time,   denies  to competitors of the supplier the oppor- 
tunity  to  compete   for  part or all  of the  trade of the customer- 
party  to  the vertical   arrangement.    However,   the Clayton Act does 
not render unlawful all  such vertical arrangements,  but  forbids 
only   those whose effect "may be  substantially to lessen competi- 
tion,   or  to  tend  to create a monopoly in any line of commerce in 
any section of the country."128 
In  its   decision on  the Ford-Autolite merger  the district court 
relied heavily  on  this   precedent of Brown Shoe.    That the acquisition 
was anticompetitive and  foreclosed  Ford as a purchaser of spark plugs 
was expressed  by  the  court  as  follows: 
The   last  phase of  the discussion involves  the  foreclosure of 
Ford as a   1960  purchaser  for all  purposes of almost  forty million 
units or  9.67. of  total   industry output.     Unlike Owosso,   Fostoria 
can fill   defendant's  entire demand  for  its  traditional  assembly 
and franchise  uses  as well  as  for Electric Autolite's old inde- 
pendent distribution channels.     In spite of what  seems   to be a 
blatant Clayton Act violation according to  the  teaching of 
Brown  Shoe  Co.  v.   United States,   supra,   in particular when seen 
-ring about  any „„.—-  
and  the Government apparently  finds no cause for alarm in 
Champion's misfortunes-because  for decades no  firm besides 
Champion had much hope   for any of defendant's  business.     Ford 
points   to   the   six-cent  concession along with Champion s  virtual y 
limitless   ability   to   lower  it, which supposedly adds up  to barely 
a possibility  that  Ford would ever be Just^ie^ ^^"^Lrket 
half a century of  engineering rapport and Champion s «"«""£' 
support by  buying elsewhere.    The  argument  flounders   in the stag 
nation required  to keep it  afloat.    At best,   it.Pro^Sf ^J°^e 
would not have deviated  from its  past sourcing  in the  *>«"""; 
future.     However,   the  horizon in  that direction is very close and 
opaque  to new circumstances  just  beyond. 
The court's  interpretation of  the foreclosure was,   then,   that 
the acquisition had no actual  anticompetitive effect;   the emphasis was 
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placed on potential   foreclosure.     The significance of this  ruling is 
that it places  potential   foreclosure on an equal  footing with actual 
foreclosure.     Thus,   we  see  that Brown Shoe  is  to actual  foreclosure as 
Ford-Autolite   is   to  potential   foreclosure.    This  is a practical exten- 
sion of the  potential  competition doctrine  into foreclosure  theory. 
Remedy 
The remedy or decision on relief of  the merger ordered Ford's 
divestiture of  the Autolite  spark plug assets  including its  trade 
name.     In addition,   it  contained  the  following provisions: 
1. Ford was enjoined   from producing spark plugs   in the United 
States   for  a  period of ten years from the date of divestiture. 
2. Ford was  ordered   to purchase at  least one-half of its  total 
annual   requirements of spark plugs   from the person or firm 
acquiring  the divested Autolite assets,   for a period ot  rive 
years   from the date of divestiture.     Such spark plugs,   the 
court  ordered,  are  to be  labeled with  the Autolite name and/or 
trademark. 
3. Ford was  enjoined not  to  "use or market  in,  or  import  into, 
the United  States  any spark plugs bearing a  trade name or 
trademark owned by or  licensed to Ford. 
The relief  granted,  as  stated by Chief Judge  Freeman,  was de- 
signed "to eradicate the   tendencies of the acquisition to substantially 
lessen competition   in the context of  the  present market and economic 
conditions."131    Thus,   to  that  end,   divestiture was  ruled to be the 
most effective  remedy: 
It appears   to  the  court   that,   in view of the ******* 
fects of  this  acquisition which have been  found  to be likely 
substantially   lessen competition in the spark plug }»*««£' 
the only  remedy  that will  effectively  correct  the situation 
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that of  divestiture.     In no other way can the  foreclosure of 
Ford be overcome.     The same   is  true of Ford's pre-1961   impact 
on the actions  of Champion and the other major manufacturers 
of spark plugs.132 
In addition,   the   injunctive provisions were provided by  the 
court to complement  the divestiture.     Specifically  the court  said, 
".   .   .  certain injunctive provisions  are required  in order  that dives- 
titure may be made effective and  to give New Fostoria an opportunity 
to establish   its  competitive  position."133 
Public Policy Toward Vertical  Integration 
Public   policy  toward vertical   integration  is  embodied  in Sec- 
tion 7 of  the Clayton Act,   as  amended by the Celler-Kefauver Act of 
1950.     It was  designed  by  the   legislature  to nip monopoly "in the 
bud."    Horizontal,   vertical,   and conglomerate mergers which may sub- 
stantially   lessen competition or  tend to create a monopoly are pro- 
scribed by   the Act.     The   legal   test   in each case  is whether  the merger 
may have an  adverse effect on competition.    Because  the Congress 
through the  years has  viewed mergers as  posing a special   threat  to 
competition,   the Celler-Kefauver Act was  designed to  place certain 
ora       It  is  quite clear,   then,   that  pub- constraints  on growth  by mergers,     it  is  qu 
lie policy  toward vertical   integration has consisted of separate 
standards   for  evaluating growth  achieved by merger  than for growth by 
internal means.     It  is   also clear  that  this  dual  set  of standards was 
explicitly  and purposefully  created  in order  to  deal with these  forms 
of vertical   integration. 
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It  is   the belief of  some economists   that vertical  integration 
by internal   growth   should be   illegal.    This per se_ argument  is  correct 
in saying that   the   result   is   the   foreclosure of all outside firms  from 
supplying or buying  from the   integrated  firm, but such a consequence 
does not merit  proscription unless  abuse of market power has been 
clearly established.     Vertical   integration per se_ should be  illegal 
only when it   serves  as  a  source or carrier of economic power.    Kayson 
and Turner,   writing  in  1959,   noted   that this theory of the  illegality 
of per se integration was  not  justified with respect  to antitrust 
court  cases  up to   that   time: 
Only two  recent   cases   involve  this  proposition in any degree: 
U.  S.  v.   Yellow Cab  (332  U.S.   218(1947)   and U.   S.   v.  Columbia 
Steel   (334 U.S.   495(1948)).     In the  former,   in the original 
deTTIion on  the  pleadings,   some element  of monopoly in at  least 
two local  cab markets was  present.    The exclusionary character 
of the  integration,   therefore,   turned  on the monopolization of 
the local  markets   for  the  purchase of cabs by monopolizing 
taxicab   service   therein.     On  the second round, when the case 
was tried on  the merits,   no monopoly was  found and the case was 
dismissed.     In Columbia  Steel   the government  did advance a per 
se argument,   but   it was  squarely rejected by  the ««Jority Of 
The Court,  which went on  to  find that  at neither  the rolling 
level   (Columbia)  nor   the   fabricating level  (Consolidated)   did 
the acquisition confer significant market power on the u.   s. 
Steel Co.   in   the western market.li 
The conduct  criteria  for evaluating  the effect of vertical 
integration  is  solidly  grounded  in economic analysis.     If,  upon merg- 
ing with another  firm vertically,   a  firm foreclosed part of a market 
by raising entry barriers   the  result would be a  reduction in size  in 
the open or   remaining  portion of  the market.    This  is  clearly a market 
power abuse  because   two  firms have effectively used their positions  to 
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bar outside   firms   from entry   into  the market.    This  raising of  the 
economies-of-scale barriers   to  entry  is called "the percentage  effect" 
by Professor Bain.     If  the economies  of  scale  in an industry are such 
that a new entrant must  command  ten  per  cent  of  industry demand,   then 
if half the market were  to be  foreclosed by vertical mergers,  a new 
entrant must  dislodge  twenty per cent of the open market   from existing 
firms.135 
It  should be  emphasized  that  in the case of the vertically  in- 
tegrated  firm,  market  power  in one  stage of production does not 
necessarily  lead  to market  power   in another.     A good example to  illus- 
trate this  point   is   provided by Mueller.136    Consider  the  small   farmer 
who is vertically  integrated   into apple  production and who  sells at 
his own roadside   stand  tc   the  consumer.     That he controls  all  stages 
of production and  distribution of apples   from the orchard to the con- 
sumer does not   bestow upon him  the addition of market  power.    However, 
taking Mueller's   example one  step  further,   if  two  different apple 
farmers possessed market   power  in separate stages,   a vertical merger 
would produce  one  unit with market power  in more  than one  stage of 
production.     The  result  could very well  be  the enhancement or en- 
trenchment  of  this market   power  to an extent   that   is not available to 
the non-integrated  apple  farmer. 
Scherer believes there is a virtual oer se rule at present in 
force against all horizontal and vertical mergers between firms with 
substantial   shares of  the market;   the rule also includes   those vertical 
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mergers likely  to   foreclose an appreciable share of some market.13' 
The divestiture of  the  Ford-Autolite merger by the district  court could 
be argued as  having been attacked on these grounds.    Scherer defines 
virtual as meaning occasional  exceptions  such as a situation where one 
firm is on the brink of financial   failure or whenever  there  is diffi- 
culty in delineating boundaries of the relevant market.    The emphasis 
here  is clearly placed on structure.    The precedent for this  rule, 
Scherer explains,  was  set  down in U.   S.  v.   Philadelphia National Bank 
et al,  374 U.S.   321,   363(1963): 
This   intense  congressional concern with the  trend toward con- 
centration warrants  dispensing,   in certain cases, with elaborate 
proof of market  structure, market behavior,   or probable anti- 
competitive effects.     Specifically, we think  that  a merger which 
produces  a  firm controlling an undue percentage share of the 
relevant market,   and results  in a significant  increase  in the 
concentration of  firms   in that market,   is  so  inherently   likely 
to lessen  competition  substantially  that  it must be enjoined  in 
the absence of  evidence clearly showing that^he merger  is not 
likely  to have   such anticompetitive effects. 
There  have  been  several   prominent critics of vertical merger 
policy.    Among   these are Robert Bork and Ward Bowman, who have used an 
interference-with-economic-efficiency argument.     They  attacked Brown 
Shoe,  using this argument.     However,   they  failed  to cite any evidence 
that would justify  their  conclusion that   the merger "promised lower 
prices."^     Bork and Bowman's  criticism notwithstanding,  there are no 
"natural"  safeguards  to guarantee  that vertical   integration will not 
result in an   industry's  becoming unnecessarily concentrated  and diffi- 
cult  to enter.     Such  is   the role of  public policy  in general  and 
Section 7  in  particular. 
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The distinction between a dual  set of policies  toward vertical 
integration  is,   to use Mueller's words,  "not  an anomaly arising from 
legislative  oversight,"  but   to  the contrary,   "it  is   rooted in sound 
economics."     He  adds,   "The  important  point  to grasp  in evaluating 
public policy with  respect  to growth achieved by vertical mergers  is 
that  it  short-circuits  the   •market'test of growth."140    Moreover,  he 
goes on to quote  Professor Heflebower: 
When a corporation chooses   to grow by building  it expects  to 
face   tests   in the market   for  the product  over  the years required 
to establish  and  develop a new operation.     It must  fight  its way 
in,   that  is,   compete  to  succeed,  and not buy its way  in.     I con- 
sider  this  a   far  better market  test,   and a more   immediately 
relevant one,   than the "market  test"  involved  in a merger  for 
the market   for  firms   is highly imperfect.   .   .   . 
Second,   in nearly  all   circumstances,  a  firm *»" "V**"1" 
is apt   to be  challenged has  the  capacity   to 8™w by building. 
It has  or  can get   the  funds,   it has  the management  capacity,   and 
often already  some of  the needed market connections. 
To sum up,  we have  a different public policy  toward vertical 
integration by merger  than  toward  integration achieved by  internal 
growth.     Such a  dichotomy of policy  is justifiable because the Con- 
gress has viewed   the   special   threat  to competition  that mergers have 
displayed.     Vertical   integration by   internal   growth   is  legal   so  long 
as  it is not  accompanied  by abuses  in market  power.     We believe  the 
rule of  law handed down  in Brown Shoe is  a good policy.     Us  effect 
has been  to  prevent  growth via vertical mergers.     In Mueller's words: 
It  is   true  that,   as  economists    -^^l^- 
fied that this policy prevaate* *• JgJ- But this policy will 
tion in shoe manufacturing and recai      ■    ,   ,   industry restruc- 
increase  the  probability   that any •*£f£l"»*E   t"t *** 
turing which  does  occur will have p »£  th. ~ integrated 
will   therefore have been rooted  in econom 
operations   rather  than in market  power. 
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Doubtless   there will  be  instances where public policy pro- 
hibits mergers which would not  seriously  injure competition. 
But  industrial  history argues  persuasively that  to err on the 
side of a   too strict  antimerger policy is  preferable  to  the 
reverse.     As  Professor Heflebower has  put   it,  "the social 
cost of error   from being  too easy  in merger policy is   far 
more  serious and   less  easily reversed than from being  too 
strict."142 
An Analysis of  the Merger 
Ford's   acquisition of the Fostoria plant was  a successful at- 
tempt  to enter   the  lucrative  replacement market without  first entering 
the original-equipment market.     It was  the  result  of  Ford's  surmise 
that it could no   longer afford   to  stay out of the replacement market. 
Since Electric Autolite was  already  firmly established as  an original- 
equipment  spark plug  producer,   the acquisition enabled  Ford to sur- 
mount the main entry barrier at   the  expense of would be and actual 
spark plug producers  hoping  to win Ford as a customer.     Had Ford ver- 
tically integrated by   internal   growth rather  than by merger,   it would 
not have been subject   to  an antitrust  violation.     We will   return to 
this question   in  the  next  chapter.     Nevertheless,   since  the Supreme 
Court has  ruled   that  vertical mergers   that   tend substantially to 
lessen competition are   illegal,   the evidence   in the Ford-Autolite mer- 
ger seems   to  fit   this   description.     That  the merger occurred within 
the setting of  a heavily  concentrated  industry,   similar  in many re- 
spects  to  the automobile   industry,  was,   in all  probability,   the big- 
gest  single   factor   that   led  to  the  district  court's  decision. 
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We  believe  the court ruled correctly  in rejecting Ford's de- 
fense.    Although   the acquisition did strengthen Ford's competitive 
position,   it  did not  strengthen competition in the spark plug market. 
In addition,   any possible benefits of a mere rearrangement of market 
shares among the   three  dominant  sellers in the industry was more  than 
offset by   the   loss  of the effect which Ford exerted on the market  as 
a potential  entrant.     This will  be clearer when viewed  in the con- 
text of our  limit  pricing model,  which  is discussed below. 
In regard  to  the   decision on relief,   the court's  ruling re- 
flected sound  economic  analysis.     The ruling did not stop short of 
structural  changes,   as   is the  case with  too many antitrust  decisions, 
but  instead attempted  to achieve a restoration of the status 400 ante. 
Rather than allowing a  situation where  the end result would have had 
the effect  of  "transmitting  the rigidity of  the oligopolistic struc- 
ture of the automobile   industry to  the spark plug industry,"  the 
divestiture decree  and   the ancillary  injunctive provisions were de- 
signed to  decrease   the  concentration in the  spark plug market and  to 
restore,   as much as   possible,   the competition which existed  in the 
market before   the acquisition.1«    In effect,   the decree lowered  the 
barriers  to entry  to  the  spark plug market  and reestablished Ford as 
a large buyer   for  ten years,   thus putting it again at  the edge of  the 
market. 
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Limit Pricing Model 
The most appropriate  approach  to  the Ford-Autolite merger,   from 
an economic   frame of reference,   is a  limit pricing model.     When viewed 
in the context of pricing to deter entry,   the district court's argu- 
ment takes on greater  significance and is much more convincing. 
By way of   introduction,   the  theory of limit pricing deals with 
a group of oligopolists who  together control a major portion of their 
industry's output and who may or may not  be colluding to maximize 
joint profits.     Their  pricing policy has   to take  into consideration 
the reactions of active  or potential members of the competitive 
fringe.    Thus,   if  the  price   is  set  above   the  level of  fringe produc- 
er's unit costs  and if  barriers   to new entry are  slight or modest,   the 
competitive   fringe expand or  enter,  whichever  the case may be,  and  the 
dominant  oligopolists'   market  share will   decline accordingly. 
Although there is a bevy of literature on the theory of limit 
pricing, Scherer's explanation is the most succinct and the most ex- 
plicit: 
The   threat  of new entry or competitive fringe grjgJJJ" 
the pricing power of a dominant  firm or a group of ««"*£• 
firms unless   steep  barriers  to entry exist.    A- J rule, tM 
dominant   firm or group can -intain mar et £      ^£* 
holding prices below a   level wh ch /J^ fc0 restrain 
profits   to   fringe members,     it   tne grouF ,.„„.-„„ Drofits, 
Jheir pricing  in  this way  so as  tc> maxim, on    run pro^ 
society  benefits   from the  lower prices.     « sney 
squeeze   the most out of  their  short-run monopoly Jjjtjj.^ 
they must pay  the  consequences  in the  *°™        concentrated. 
from power,   and the   industry will become  less 
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Neither alternative ensures  that price will be driven,   sooner 
or later,   all   the way  down  to  the competitive  level.     It   is pos- 
sible,  under  certain conditions,   for a dominant  firm or collusive 
oligopoly  to  exclude new entry while retaining some supra-normal 
profits.     The main questions  remaining are, how far above costs 
can price be held without   inducing entry?    And upon what does 
this  price-cost margin depend?I** 
Ford's  position as  a potential  entrant at  the edge of the spark 
plug market   influenced  the group of oligopolists—Champion,   General 
Motors,  and Electric Autolite,  whose homogeneous product insures that 
sales are made at   identical   prices--to  forego monopolistic profits   for 
the sake of maintaining an entry-deterring limit price  in the replace- 
ment market.     Since  economies  of scale are most   likely a significant 
factor,   these   firms  probably earned  supra-normal  profits through  the 
years.    However,   their  pricing  policy obviously consisted of  the 
initially  lower but   persistent   profits   from an entry-limiting strategy, 
rather than  the   initially higher but eventually lower profits  from a 
short-run maximization strategy. 
The relationship between cost advantages and  pricing behavior 
in the industry  can be easily characterized by effectively  impeded 
entry.     Such a  situation exists,  according to Bain and Scherer,  when- 
ever "the existing dominant group has  an advantage over fringe members 
or potential   entrants and  finds  it  preferable  to  forego short-run 
' , ,     ,otcr pntrv."
145    This strategy, more profit maximization  in order  to deter entry. 
than likely,   resulted  in a continuing stream of supra-normal  profits 
to the dominant  spark plug producers  until   Ford's entry in  1961. 
If we are   to   follow Scherer's analysis on the  theory of limit 
pricing,   then  society should have benefited  from the  lower  spark plug 
prices  that  supposedly existed  so  long as  Ford was a potential  entrant 
and threatening entry  into  the market.    This  is,  no doubt,   the posi- 
tion the court  took when  it made  its decision.     If this analysis  is 
correct,  we  should  expect  the price  in the replacement market to rise 
as a result of  the merger.    Unfortunately, we do not have the evidence 
to substantiate  such  speculation.     On balance,   our conclusion is  that 
the merger acted as a concentration-increasing force  in the spark plug 
market.    What  effect   it had on the  price of spark plugs remains  to be 
seen.    We now turn  to   its  effects on structure,   conduct,  and perfor- 
mance . 
Structural.   Conduct,   and  Performance Effects 
In  terms of  the number and size distribution of the  sellers of 
spark plugs   in the  industry,   the  post-acquisitional  structure saw no 
major shake-up.     The number of sellers  increased by one after 1961. 
Furthermore,   Champion   lost  ten per cent of the market  to General 
Motors.     Ford assumed Electric Autolite1s market share.    The merger 
increased  the concentration in  the market.     Before  1961,   the first 
three firms  controlled  approximately ninety-five  per cent of the mar- 
ket;  after   1961,   the  first  four  firms controlled ninety-seven and 
seven-tenths  per cent  of the market.!"    However,  this difference was 
slight.     It   is   interesting  to note  that   if Ford had entered the market 
independently of Electric Autolite,   the number of firms would also 
have increased by one.     It  is not  certain,   though, how long Electric 
Autolite would have   lasted before  its excess capacity would have 
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forced it  to  sell  Fostoria at a  rock bottom price. 
It  is extremely difficult  to assess  the net  effects  on market 
conduct of  the  Ford-Autolite merger,  because so little information is 
available concerning market  conduct.     Ford's entry into the market 
made it one of  the  big  three oligopolists,   free  to assume Electric 
Autolite's place   in pricing  strategy.    We cannot say for sure whether 
or not implicit  collusion exists   in this market.     However,  we can 
compare it  to  the  automobile  industry where  implicit collusion does 
occur.    The  pricing pattern  in that market has historically been 
characterized by price   leadership-followership and pure oligopolistic 
interdependence.     It   is   interesting to observe  that  price uniformity 
seems to be   the rule not  only  in  the automobile market but  in the 
spark plug market  as well.     In  the  latter,   price consistency on the 
manufacturing  level  has  prevailed since  1963;   and as of January,   1970, 
manufacturers'   spark plug prices  to warehouse distributors were as 
follows:     Autolite,   $.4234;   Champion,   $.4181;  General Motors  (AC), 
$.4200.K7 
Because there have been no significant manufacturing price 
differentials on spark plugs after the merger, we can only conclude 
that the merger had a tendency to intensify non-price competition 
with particular emphasis on advertising. Historically, all three 
major spark plug producers have channeled exorbitant amounts of funds 
into advertising each year. Promotion has consisted primarily of 
publicity  in  trade magazines  aimed at  the wholesaling segment of  the 
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market,  but much   Is  also  directed  toward retailing.     Speaking on the 
subject  of publicity,   one  Electric Autolite sales brochure prepared 
for presentation  to  Ford  in 1960 explained advertising as  follows: 
Reliable  surveys continually  indicate that only a small 
percentage of car owners specify a brand when ordering a  change 
in spark plugs.     This   fact establishes  the  (franchise)  dealer 
and   the   service  station operator as   the actual consumer of 
spark plugs.     However,   to  sell   these outlets,   it is  essential 
to convince dealers and owner-operators  that  the public will 
accept   the brand  spark plugs  once  installed.    Accomplishing 
this  requires  considerable  and effective advertising for pub- 
lic review as  well  as   the merchandising of these advertisements 
to the  trade   level.148 
All  available evidence   indicates  that  technical  efficiency  in 
the spark plug  industry depends upon the existence of an original- 
equipment customer.     The  removal  of Ford as a potential original- 
equipment customer  available to  current  and potential spark plug 
producers  indicates   insurmountable barriers  to entry  for potential 
plug producers vis a vis   the fixed number of automobile producers 
which generate original  equipment.    This   is  to say that,   if  technical 
efficiency  is  used as  the   sole  criterion  for existence,   the  spark plug 
market   is,   for all   practical  purposes,  closed to potential  entrants 
because of  the OE  tie.     If a spark plug producer were to enter the 
market,   it  could  not  operate at   the minimum point on its   long run 
average cost  curve without  an original-equipment customer.     Eltra's 
. TV,O Hi strict court had this   to position  in the market  is   precarious.     The district 
say about Eltra's  position: 
...     At  present Eltra is   -J-^^A^'JS^SSEI 
ant waiting  in  the wings  for the  star to break      leg, 
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himself  in the meantime with bit parts.     It  sells  to the 
private brand merchandisers and  distributors under "Presto- 
lite" wherever  it  can,  all   for  1.27. of domestic shipments 
in 1964.     Because  of  the meager  demand to  date,  Eltra has 
not been justified   in baking insulators  internally;   instead, 
it gets   these most  sophisticated  plug components  from Ford. 
However,   its  current  debilitation is not  to suggest  that 
Eltra   is beyond redemption.    Clearly,   it has an aggressive 
spark plug organization with respected expertise.    Ceramic 
capability   is easily within reach whenever revenue warrants 
the expenditure.     Yet,  even though Chrysler now considers 
Eltra an acceptable  supplier,   the difficulty  in dislodging 
Champion  is monumental.     Champion's  unexcelled promotional 
campaigns are good   for the  franchise-dealer replacement 
trade.     In addition,  Champion has made a revolutionary con- 
cession  in agreeing to  furnish,   starting in 1964,  one quar- 
ter of Chrysler's assembly requirements under the latter s 
own "Mopar"  brand,   but  still  at  six cents  each,  and,   in 
effect,   to  subsidize an attempt  to gain a  foothold  for       ( 
"Mopar" with an eye  toward eventually stripping    Champion 
of the   last vestiges of major new-automobile status.     Bar- 
ring a classic  blunder,   Champion's  tenure seems  secure  for 
the near   future.   ^9 
The court's  conclusion concerning technical efficiency and 
Eltra's survival  was   stated  in these words: 
...     For   the moment   it   is sufficient  to observe that   the 
greater  the  dependence of survival upon orxginal;e^Pm^nt 
Identification,   the more  grave  the elimination of Ford as 
a potential   entrant   from the viewpoint of consumer protec 
tion,   the ultimate object  of antitrust legislation    .   .   . 
If any   firm could be  called meaningless,   it w°u^b* ^J^ 
Lacking  important new car affiliation,  Eltra th 
like a  pygmy whose growth will   be  stunted by Jefxciencies 
for which no amount  of exertion can compensate      "could 
indefinitely be without  this critical backing ««»»«•» 
too crippled  in   the aftermarket  to begin to curb Ford s 
excesses.*50 
In conclusion,   the most  significant effects of the merger were 
that  it  increased  the  concentration in an already highly concentrated 
market;   it   raised  the  barriers to entry  for outside firms;   it intensi- 
fled non-price  competition,   and it  contributed  to the trend of price 
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stability in the industry. In addition, interseller coordination and 
price leadership-followership policies and colluding policies will no 
doubt continue to be the norm as long as the industry is comprised of 
a few dominant  producers  controlling the majority of the market. 
Summary 
We have presented in this chapter the Ford-Autolite litigation. 
We have summarized the arguments of the government and Ford. We have 
discussed the final decision of the district court and the relevant 
antitrust cases to the decision. In addition, we have attempted an 
analysis of the merger in terms of a limit pricing model. Finally, 
we have concluded with the structural, conduct, and performance ef- 
fects of the merger. 
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V.     SUMMARY  AND CONCLUSIONS 
What were   the alternatives  facing Ford before it purchased the 
spark plug plant   from Electric Autolite?    Was growth into the spark 
plug market  by   internal  means a  feasible alternative  for Ford?     If so, 
what capital   requirements  did Ford confront and what were the barriers 
to entry?    Most   importantly, what risks were  involved and what did 
Ford stand  to  gain   from vertical   integration via internal means rather 
than by the merger  route?     These  issues are  the subject of this  chap- 
ter.    In addition,   we  shall  attempt  in this  chapter to arrive at a set 
of  logical  conclusions concerning the Ford-Autolite merger. 
An Overview of  Ford's Alternatives 
Ford had  at   its   disposal   three alternatives  concerning spark 
plug operations: 
1. Continue   to  purchase   from Champion at  the ^jflSSS!1*1 
price   that was  some   14 cents  less  than  if sourced inside. 
2. Build  its own  spark  plug plant,   thereby sullying its own 
needs   for  Ford cars  as well  as  selling spark plug 
replacement market. 
Merge with  an ongoing spark plug joncf^fj'^tfjo^tilia 
ties   to  supply   Ford's needs as wel    as  the capacity 
Ford's  desire  to  penetrate  the replacement market. 
,    L n« hasic decision-making 
Whatever  alternative  Ford chose,   its basic 
criterion can be  represented as  follows: 
C =    Rj +    R2      +    ••• 
+    Rn 
3. ze 
(1+i)   (1+i)2 
(l+i)n 
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This  is,   of course,   the  general  equation for the present value of a 
future  income   stream.     C  stands   for the present value of spark plug 
operations;   i   is   the rate of return to capital,  and R represents 
future sums  of   income   from spark plug production.     Rj, R2» t^ is  sub- 
ject to a probability  distribution with the major aspects of the 
problem being matters  of uncertainty  as to quantity of spark plugs to 
be produced and cancellation of outside contracts. 
The  evidence  introduced   in the  district court  indicated that 
Ford was  pursuing the  second option before  it merged with Electric 
Autolite.152     Although   the government  could not prove that  Ford was 
on the brink of entering  the  spark plug market  through internal  ex- 
pansion,   the  probability of entry,  based on the government's   findings, 
was  indeed high.     There were many positive signs mentioned by the 
government. 153    We have already  referred earlier to one-Ford's pre- 
liminary study  in  1960 which   forecast a  long-term after-tax yield on 
capital  of  twenty-four and  three-tenths  per cent on  the basis of a 
five per cent  penetration of  the replacement market.154    This  is 
especially   interesting  in  light  of the  fifteen per cent company norm 
for new investments.     Another was  the  recommendation by  the Business 
development  office  of  a  fifty-two million unit spark plug plant. 
That  this   proposal  was  not  processed  in detail  by Ford's  Integration 
Committee and  was never brought   to the attention of either the Execu- 
tive Committee or  the Board of Directors was  the direct result of the 
availability  of  Fostoria. 
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We  are   provided with additional   insights by the trial concern- 
ing the capital  requirements,   entry barriers,   and risks  facing Ford: 
A plug   factory would have  fit neatly  into defendant's  de- 
signs   for  augmented  component manufacture and distribution, 
and would have been worthwhile over the  long haul.    On the 
other hand,   nothing has been said about start-up costs, al- 
though  the   inference  is   that  they would have been heavy be- 
cause of the  lengthy experimentation necessary  to arrive at 
satisfactorily  engineered  plugs.     In addition,   industry 
stocking habits  and  the  six-cent price pointed toward an 
extraordinary  delay before the contemplated  facilities would 
pay off.     The unanimous   consensus  of experienced witnesses 
was  that  a minimum of   five to  eight years would elapse from 
the point   Ford  started using the new elements  in its  cars un- 
til enough  Ford-plug-equipped  automobiles would be on the 
road  to create a real retailer  interest  in the product. 
Practically no machine  requires a  plug change during the  ini- 
tial   18 months  of  its   life,  and most do not much before their 
third  anniversaries.     Several model years'   outputs would have 
to approach  this milestone before   their proportion of the 
whole vehicle  population would prompt outlets to  inventory 
the new brand.     Only  then would a mechanic pick this   label 
for General  Motors  and Chrysler applications.    Meanwhile,   of 
course,  defendant would be missing many sales  for lord 
machines.     Few neophytes  can expect an onrush of »»**" 
acceptance.     All must  prepare   for a  few lean season    a    the 
outset.     What  complicated  the   problem at Ford was the unusual 
arrangement with  Champion.     In  1960,  defendant needed about 
16 million  assembly  plugs;   each would have been MM 14 C«tS 
more expensive   if  sourced   inside rather  than to Champion.    The 
aggregate   differential,   2.2 million dol ars, wou d.j£Jf!!let 
cSmuUted   annually  to  form a worrisome «e£i«t  xn itseIf     let 
alone when combined with  unrecovered start-up *££»"**£? 
time  Ford   scratched  the  surface in the aftermarket    and    be 
cause  the   loss would have recurred perpetually^ 
been erased  for  a number of years  thereafter. 
The court  continues  on  to mention  the  possibility of a merger: 
Although he was   far  ^om comprehensive  in his reasons,^Irving 
Duffy,   a recently retired member of*th««        DfrectorSf 
Executive Committees as well  as of the BO ^ 
stated unequivocally  that the  six-cent  price lume 
between the beginning of mass  production «    lucrativ ^ ^ 
would have  prohibited entry around  19bU o reduced, 
ner  in which  the  interval  could have been sharply 
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i.e.,  by  the   take-over of an established trade name.    Because 
Mr.  Duffy was   so conclusory,  he must be deemed to have been 
expressing his  personal   convictions.156 
Had  Ford known how very  tough Section 7 was  to become would it 
have merged with Electric Autolite?    Our  feeling is that it would not 
have done  so.     If   there had been more court cases ruling against 
vertical mergers   prior   to   1961,   Ford probably would have proceeded 
with the second option even  though the spark plug facilities of Elec- 
tric Autolite had become  available. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This   paper has  been concerned with:     (1)   the Ford-Autolite 
merger of  1961;   (2)  vertical   integration either by  internal expansion 
or by merger;   (3)   potential   competition and the role  that  it played 
in the merger;   (A)   an economic  investigation of the major  industry 
involved-the spark plug  industry;   and  (5)   public policy toward ver- 
tical   integration. 
Its  conclusions  are: 
1.  The   spark plug  industry  is heavily concentrated with only 
Champion,   Ford,   and  General  Motors  ««£*!"."£" 
sellers.     The   industry can afford more competition. 
2. The  Ford-Autolite merger was anticompetitive;   it helped » 
raise   the  entry  barriers  to an already highly oiig P 
industry. 
3. The  district  court's   analysis was essentially-orrect^ 
though  it   failed   to  provide  a  limit price      6 
the merger. 
4. The  decision of  the  district court was correct and divesti- 
ture  was   the  proper and  the most effective remedy 
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Vertical   integration affects  competition in many ways,  e.g., 
structural   effects   such as  source of economic power,  raising entry 
barriers via  foreclosure,   control of  limited resources,   large capital 
requirements  and conduct effects such as price  squeezing and dis- 
criminatory pricing.     Because of these various ways that competition 
is affected by vertical   integration,   determination of  its effects  is 
a complex empirical   task,  one   that  requires economic analysis.    With 
respect to market   structure as  affected by vertical  integration,   the 
appropriate   framework  for analysis   is   industrial  organization 
theory-structure,   conduct,  and performance approach.     As Mueller put 
it:    "An especially   fertile  area  for analysis  in this regard  is em- 
pirical   inquiry   into   the ways   in which vertical   integration may raise 
various entry barriers,   including capital  requirements,   economies of 
scale, and  product   differentiation." 
It was   precisely  this   that we attempted in this paper.    We 
attempted   to analyze   the market  structure of spark plugs and how it 
was affected by  the  vertical merger of  Ford and Electric Autolite. 
The district court's decision was solidly grounded according 
to the legal precedent laid down by the Supreme Court in Brown Shoe. 
It had the effect of preventing Ford, the second largest automobile 
producer, and Electric Autolite from growing vertically via the mer- 
ger route, an effect proscribed by Section 7 of the Clayton Act. We 
are inclined to agree with Professor Heflebower. The market test of 
growth was  clearly  precluded by the  Ford-Autolite merger.     Ford,   as 
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we pointed out,   possessed  the capacity and was on the verge of growing 
by internal means.     If antitrust  policy  is to be effective,   the gov- 
ernment must  prosecute whenever a violation of the law has occurred. 
Although Fostoria  satisfied  Ford's entry requirements of establishing 
a nationwide  distribution organization oriented toward the replacement 
market and of having  a nationally recognized brand name,  Ford will be 
hard pressed   to vertically   integrate  itself via internal expansion 
after the   tenth year has elapsed. 
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